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A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff the following three 
conditions hold for every pair of adjacent routers p and q in the network. First, p 
does not forward any message to q if q has not been up and reachable. Second, 
when q receives a message m supposedly from p, then q can check that m was not 
modified after it was sent. Third, when q receives a message m supposedly from 
p, then q can check that m was not a replay of an old message sent by p. In this 
dissertation, we propose three protocols that can be added to the routers in a 
computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus 
overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are the secure 
address resolution protocol, the weak hop integrity protocol, and the strong hop 
integrity protocol. The secure address resolution protocol includes an invite-
accept protocol and a request-reply protocol, and requires a secure server 
 vii
connected to the Ethernet. The weak hop integrity protocol includes a secret 
exchange protocol and an integrity check protocol. The strong hop integrity 
protocol combines a soft sequence number protocol with the weak hop integrity 
protocol. We also present an alternative way to achieve strong hop integrity with 
hard sequence numbers. All the protocols are stateless, require small overhead, 
and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.  
 viii
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Most computer networks suffer from the following security problem: in a 
typical network, an adversary, that has an access to the network, can insert new 
messages, modify current messages, or replay old messages in the network. In 
many cases, the inserted, modified, or replayed messages can go undetected for 
some time until they cause severe damage to the network. More importantly, the 
physical location in the network where the adversary inserts new messages, 
modifies current messages, or replays old messages may never be determined. 
One type of such malicious attacks is called denial-of-service attack 
[CERT96], which manages to exhaust the communicating resources of a network 
or the computing resources of a host in order to largely reduce or completely deny 
normal services provided by a network or a host. Two well-known examples of 
denial-of-service attacks in networks that support the Internet Protocol (or IP, for 
short) and the Transmission Control Protocol (or TCP, for short) are as follows. 
 
i. Smurf Attack: 
In an IP network, any computer can send a “ping” message to any other 
computer which replies by sending back a “pong” message to the first 
computer as required by Internet Control Message Protocol (or ICMP, for 
short) [Pos81]. The ultimate destination in the pong message is the same 
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as the original source in the ping message. An adversary can utilize these 
messages to attack a computer d in such a network as follows. First, the 
adversary inserts into the network a ping message whose original source is 
computer d and whose ultimate destination is a multicast address for every 
computer in the network. Second, a copy of the inserted ping message is 
sent to every computer in the network. Third, every computer in the 
network replies to its ping message by sending a pong message to 
computer d. Thus, computer d is flooded by pong messages that it had not 
requested. 
ii. SYN Attack: 
To establish a TCP connection between two computers c and d, one of the 
two computers c sends a “SYN” message to the other computer d. When d 
receives the SYN message, it reserves some of its resources for the 
expected connection and sends a “SYN-ACK” message to c. When c 
receives the SYN-ACK message, it replies by sending back an “ACK” 
message to d. If d receives the ACK message, the connection is fully 
established and the two computers can start exchanging their data 
messages over the established connection. On the other hand, if d does not 
receive the ACK message for a specified time period of T seconds after it 
has sent the SYN-ACK message, d discards the partially established 
connection and releases all the resources reserved for that connection. The 
net effect of this scenario is that computer d has lost some of its resources 
for T seconds. An adversary can take advantage of such a scenario to 
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attack computer d as follows [CERT96, VVI98]. First, the adversary 
inserts into the network successive waves of SYN messages whose 
original sources are different (so that these messages cannot be easily 
detected and filtered out from the network) and whose ultimate destination 
is d. Second, d receives the SYN messages, reserves its resources for the 
expected connections, replies by sending SYN-ACK messages, then waits 
for the corresponding ACK messages which will never arrive. Third, the 
net effect of each wave of inserted SYN messages is that computer d loses 
all its resources for T seconds. 
 
In these (and other [Jon95]) types of attacks, an adversary inserts into the 
network messages with wrong original sources. These messages are accepted by 
unsuspecting routers and routed toward the computer under attack. To counter 
these attacks, each router p in the network should route a received message m 
only after it checks that the original source in m is a computer adjacent to p or m 
is forwarded to p by an adjacent router q. Performing the first check is 
straightforward, whereas performing the second check requires special protocols 
between adjacent routers. In this dissertation, we present the concept of hop 
integrity between adjacent routers: whenever a router p receives a message m 
from an adjacent router q, p can detect whether m was indeed sent by q or it was 
modified or replayed by an adversary that operates between p and q. 
We detail the concept of hop integrity as follows. A network consists of 
computers connected to subnetworks. (Examples of subnetworks are local area 
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networks, telephone lines, and satellite links. We base our presentation on local 
area networks, in particular Ethernets.) Two computers in a network are called 
adjacent iff both computers are connected to the same subnetwork. Two adjacent 
computers in a network can exchange messages over any common subnetwork to 
which they are both connected. 
The computers in a network are classified into hosts and routers. For 
simplicity, we assume that each host in a network is connected to one subnetwork, 
and each router is connected to two or more subnetworks via distinct interfaces. A 
message m is transmitted from a computer s to a faraway computer d in the same 
network as follows. First, message m is transmitted in one hop from computer s to 
a router r.1 adjacent to s. Second, message m is transmitted in one hop from router 
r.1 to router r.2 adjacent to r.1, and so on. Finally, message m is transmitted in one 
hop from a router r.n that is adjacent to computer d to computer d. 
Now, we are ready to discuss the ingredients of hop integrity. A network 
is said to provide hop integrity iff the following three conditions hold for every 
pair of adjacent routers p and q in the network. 
 
i. Detection of Next-Hop Failure: 
Router p does not send any message m to router q over the subnetwork 
connecting p and q unless router q has been up and reachable shortly 
before m is sent. 
ii. Detection of Message Modification: 
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Whenever router q receives a message m over the subnetwork connecting 
routers p and q, q can determine correctly whether message m was 
modified by an adversary after it was sent by p and before it was received 
by q. 
iii. Detection of Message Replay: 
Whenever router q receives a message m over the subnetwork connecting 
routers p and q, and determines that message m was not modified, then q 
can determine correctly whether message m is another copy of a message 
that is received earlier by q. 
 
The first condition infers sending integrity, in which a sender does not 
send a message to the receiver of the message unless the sender is sure the 
receiver has been up and reachable shortly before. The second and third 
conditions infer receiving integrity, in which whenever a receiver receives a 
message from a sender, the receiver can verify whether m was indeed sent by the 
sender or it was modified or replayed by an adversary that operates between the 
receiver and the sender. Note that the sender and the receiver referred to in our 
presentation of hop integrity are one hop away from each other, i.e. they are 
connected to the same subnetwork. 
For a network to provide hop integrity, we propose that the hop integrity 
protocol suite needs to be added to the protocol stack in each router in the 
network. The hop integrity protocol suite consists of following three protocols: 
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i. Secure Address Resolution Protocol: 
Secure address resolution protocol can detect next-hop failure. This 
protocol can be used to counter denial-of-service attacks that involve ARP 
spoofing [Sko01, Wha01]. 
ii. Weak Hop Integrity Protocol: 
Weak hop integrity protocol can detect message modification. This 
protocol can be used to overcome denial-of-service attacks that involve 
message modification and do not involve message replay.  
iii. Strong Hop Integrity Protocol: 
Strong hop integrity protocol is an enhanced version of weak hop integrity 
protocol in that besides detecting message modification, this protocol can 
also detect message replay. This protocol can be used to overcome denial-
of-service attacks that involve message modification or message replay. 
 
As discussed in [Com88] and [Ste94], the protocol stack of each router (or 
host) in a network consists of four protocol layers. They are (from bottom to top): 
the subnetwork layer, the network layer, the transport layer, and the application 
layer. The secure address resolution protocol needs to be added to the subnetwork 
layer of this protocol stack, whereas the weak hop integrity protocol and the 
strong hop integrity protocol need to be added to the network layer. 
Note that these proposed protocols are based on the following assumption: 
 
Secure Router Assumption: 
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The routers in the network and the software used by them are assumed to 
be secure and so they cannot be compromised by any adversary. 
 
An adversary who wants to attack the network can compromise any group 
of hosts in the network and can cause them to execute actions on behalf of the 
adversary. However, under the Secure Router Assumption, the protocols of our 
hop integrity protocol suite can detect and defeat the adversary actions. 
It is instructive to compare hop integrity with secure routing [Che97, 
MB96, SMG97], traceback [BLT01, SWK+01, SPS+01], and IPsec [KA98a]. In 
secure routing, for example [Che97], [MB96], and [SMG97], the routing update 
messages that routers exchange are authenticated. This authentication ensures that 
every routing update message, that is modified or replayed, is detected and 
discarded. By contrast, hop integrity ensures that all messages (whether data or 
routing update messages), that are modified or replayed, are detected and 
discarded. 
The purpose of traceback is for the destination under attack to reconstruct 
the path traversed by the attacking messages, so as to identify the real origin(s) of 
the messages responsible for the attack. Two schemes have been proposed to 
achieve traceback: message marking scheme [BLT01, SWK+01] and hash-based 
scheme [SPS+01]. In message marking scheme, when a router r receives a 
message m, it sends the traceback information, namely the pair (r, m), to the 
ultimate destination of the message. The traceback information for a message m is 
either sent in the ID field of IP header of message m itself [SWK+01] or sent in a 
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separate ICMP message [BLT01]. Due to the overhead incurred by sending 
traceback information, both Bellovin and Savage employ probabilistic methods 
rather than applying their methods to every message. In hash-based scheme, when 
a router r receives a message m, r stores the traceback information (r, m) in a hash 
table for some (relatively short) time. In these two schemes, a denial-of-service 
attack has to proceed for some time before the ultimate destination that is under 
the attack can detect the attack sources, if at all, and block them. In other words, 
these are detection-and-resolution schemes. By contrast, hop integrity is a 
prevention scheme. An attacking message, usually with a false source address, 
will be detected and discarded in its first hop. Thus, denial-of-service attacks will 
be prevented before they start. 
The hop integrity protocol suite introduced in this dissertation and the 
IPsec protocol suite presented in [KA98a], [KA98b], [KA98c], [MSS+98], and 
[Orm98] are both intended to provide security at the network layer. Nevertheless, 
these two protocol suites provide different, and somewhat complementary, 
services. On one hand, the hop integrity protocols are to be executed at all routers 
in a network, and they provide a minimum level of security for all 
communications between adjacent routers in that network. On the other hand, the 
IPsec protocols are to be executed at selected pairs of computers in the network, 
and they provide sophisticated levels of security for the communications between 
these selected computer pairs. Clearly, one can envision networks where the hop 
integrity protocol suite and the IPsec protocol suite are both supported. When 
operating hand in hand, the hop integrity protocol suite can provide router 
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authentication, router-to-router message integrity, and determination of the 
adversary location when the network is under attack, whereas the IPsec protocol 
suite can support source authentication, end-to-end message integrity, and 
confidentiality. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we 
define denial-of-service attacks and reiterate the need for hop integrity under the 
threat of these attacks. In the following three chapters, we introduce the three 
components of hop integrity protocol suite. First, in Chapter 3 we propose a 
secure address resolution protocol that can achieve detection of next-hop failure. 
Second, in Chapter 4 we propose the weak hop integrity protocol that can achieve 
detection of message modification. Third, in Chapter 5 we propose the strong hop 
integrity protocol that can achieve detection of message replay in addition to 
achieving detection of message modification. Then in Chapter 6, we present an 
alternative way to construct the strong hop integrity protocol using hard sequence 
numbers. In Chapter 7, we illustrate three other applications of hop integrity 
besides overcoming most denial-of-service attacks. We conclude our presentation 
and discuss a list of open problems in Chapter 8. 
The protocols in this dissertation are specified using a variation of the 
Abstract Protocol Notation presented in [Gou98]. In this notation, each process in 
a protocol is defined by a set of inputs, a set of variables, and a set of actions. For 
example, in a protocol consisting of processes px and qx, process px can be 
defined as follows. 
 
 process  px 
 9
 inp <name of input> : <type of input> 
  … 
  <name of input> : <type of input> 
 var <name of variable> : <type of variable> 
  … 
  <name of variable> : <type of variable> 
 begin 
  <action> 
 [] <action> 
 … 
 [] <action> 
 end 
 
Comments can be added anywhere in a process definition; each comment 
is placed between the two brackets { and }. 
The inputs of process px can be read but not updated by the actions of 
process px. Thus, the value of each input of px is either fixed or is updated by 
another process outside the protocol consisting of px and qx. The variables of 
process px can be read and updated by the actions of process px. Each <action> of 
process px is of the form: 
<guard> → <statement> 
The <guard> of an action of px is either a <boolean expression> or a 
<receive> statement of the form: 
rcv <message> from qx 
The <statement> of an action of px is a sequence of skip, <assignment>, 
<send>, <selection>, or <iteration> statements. An <assignment> statement is of 
the form: 
<variable of px> := <expression> 
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A <send> statement is of the form: 
send <message> to qx 
A <selection> statement is of the form: 
if <boolean expression> → <statement> 
… 
[] <boolean expression> → <statement> 
fi 
A <iteration> statement is of the form: 
do <boolean expression> → <statement> 
od 
Note that the <assignment> statement simultaneously can assign new 
values to multiple variables. Consider for example the following <assignment> 
statement 
wdw[j], j := false, j+1 
In this statement, the j-th element of the boolean array wdw is assigned the 
value false, and the value of variable j is incremented by one. 
Executing an action consists of executing the statement of this action. 
Executing the actions (of different processes) in a protocol proceeds according to 
the following three rules. First, an action is executed only when its guard is true. 
Second, the actions in a protocol are executed one at a time. Third, an action 
whose guard is continuously true is eventually executed. 
Executing an action of process px can cause a message to be sent to 
process qx. There are two channels between the two processes: one is from px to 
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qx, and the other is from qx to px. Each sent message from px to qx remains in the 
channel from px to qx until it is eventually received by process qx or is lost. 
Messages that reside simultaneously in a channel form a sequence <m.1; m.2; …; 
m.n> in accordance with the order in which they have been sent. The head 
message in the sequence, m.1, is the earliest sent, and the tail message in the 
sequence, m.n, is the latest sent. The messages are to be received in the same 
order in which they were sent. 
We assume that an adversary exists between processes px and qx, and that 
this adversary can perform the following three types of actions a finite number of 
times to disrupt the communications between px and qx. First, the adversary can 
perform a message loss action where it discards the head message from one of the 
two channels between px and qx. Second, the adversary can perform a message 
modification action where it arbitrarily modifies the contents of the head message 
in one of the two channels between px and qx. Third, the adversary can perform a 
message replay action where it replaces the head message in one of the two 
channels by a message that was sent previously. For simplicity, we assume that 
each head message in one of the two channels between px and qx is affected by at 
most one adversary action. 
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Chapter 2 
Denial-of-Service Attacks 
 
A series of denial-of-service attacks that occurred in the past few years 
have caused severe problems to many Internet Service Providers (ISP) and online 
services, and have also posed new challenges to network security experts. Most of 
the success of denial-of-service attacks can be attributed to the two-sided nature 
of these attacks: they are quite easy to launch but extremely hard to defend 
against. Denial-of-service attacks are easy to launch because generating messages 
of these attacks takes as few as just one computer and some handy tools that can 
be downloaded from the Internet. They are hard to defend against because the 
messages generated by denial-of-service attacks are almost indistinguishable from 
those normal messages generated by legitimate users. 
The aim of denial-of-service attacks is to largely reduce or completely 
deny normal services provided by a network or a host. According to the ways 
these attacks achieve their goal, denial-of-service attacks can be divided into two 
categories [Sko01]. The first category is called communication-stopping attacks: 
attacks in this category stop the communication of the target host with the outside 
world, for example ARP spoofing attack. The second category is called resource-
exhausting attacks: attacks in this category exhaust the communicating resources 
of the target network or the computing resources of the target host, for example 
Smurf attack, SYN attack, and distributed denial-of-service attack. In the next two 
 13
sections, we discuss how the attacks in each of the two categories prevail, and 
why hop integrity is needed to counter these attacks. 
 
2.1 COMMUNICATION-STOPPING ATTACKS 
In this type of attacks, an adversary manages to stop the communications 
between the target host and the outside world, such that the target host cannot get 
normal services provided by the outside world, and the outside world cannot get 
normal services provided by the target host. ARP spoofing attack [Sko01, Wha01] 
is an attack that is often used to achieve this goal. 
We first give an introduction to ARP before we discuss the mechanism 
and defenses of ARP spoofing attack. The Address Resolution Protocol [Plu82], 
or ARP for short, is a protocol for mapping an IP address to a hardware address 
that is recognized in the local network, in particular an Ethernet. To illustrate the 
operation of ARP, consider the following scenario in which a network consists of 
n computers h[0], h[1], … , h[n-1]. These n computers are connected to the same 
Ethernet. Before any computer h[i] can send a message m to any other computer 
h[j] in this network, h[i] needs to obtain the hardware address of h[j]. This can be 
accomplished using ARP as follows. First, the ARP process in h[i] broadcasts a 
rqst(ipa) message over the Ethernet to every other computer in the network, where 
ipa is the IP address of the destination computer h[j]. Second, when the ARP 
process in any computer other than h[j] receives the rqst(ipa) message, it detects 
that ipa is not its own IP address and discards the message. Third, when the ARP 
process in computer h[j] receives the rqst(ipa) message, it detects that ipa is its 
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own IP address, and sends a rply(ipa, hda) message over the Ethernet to computer 
h[i], where hda is the required hardware address of computer h[j]. When computer 
h[i] receives the rply(ipa, hda) message, it attaches hda to message m, sends 
m(hda) over the Ethernet to computer h[j], and keeps this mapping of ipa and hda 
(of computer h[j]) in an ARP cache for some time. Next time, if computer h[i] 
wants to send another message m′ to computer h[j], h[i] first checks its ARP 
cache to see whether the entry of h[j]’s ipa and hda has expired. If the entry has 
not expired yet, h[i] sends m′(hda) over the Ethernet to h[j]. Otherwise, h[i] 
repeats the process described above to obtain the hardware address of h[j]. 
This scenario demonstrates that there are three functions for ARP: 
 
i. Resolving IP Addresses:  
Using ARP, each computer can obtain the hardware address of any other 
computer (using the IP address of that other computer) on the same 
Ethernet. 
ii. Supporting Dynamic Assignment of Addresses:  
ARP can be used to resolve the IP addresses of computers on the same 
Ethernet even if the IP addresses assigned to these computers change over 
time. For example, consider the case where a mobile computer visits an 
Ethernet. In this case, the mobile computer can be assigned a temporary IP 
address through some configuration protocol like DHCP [Dro97]. Then, 
the other computers on the Ethernet can use ARP to resolve this temporary 
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IP address to the hardware address of the mobile computer, and so can 
send messages to that computer. 
iii. Detecting Destination Failures: 
Consider the case where a computer h[i] needs to resolve the IP address 
ipa of another computer h[j] on the same Ethernet. Computer h[i] 
broadcasts a rqst(ipa) message over the Ethernet. If h[j] happens to be 
down at this time, then no rply(ipa, hda) message will be returned to h[i] 
and h[i] will not send an m(hda) message over the Ethernet. Thus, ARP 
ensures that no m(hda) message is sent over the Ethernet unless the 
destination computer of this message has been up shortly before m(hda) is 
sent. 
 
The simplicity of ARP has made it widely used in the Internet. 
Unfortunately, this simplicity makes ARP vulnerable to two types of spoofing 
attacks. To describe these two types of ARP spoofing attack, consider a scenario 
where an adversary computer h[k], which is on the same Ethernet as computer 
h[i], wants to stop the communication of h[i] with the outside world. Thus, h[k] 
sends forged ARP reply messages to poison the ARP caches of h[i] and all other 
computers on the Ethernet. There are two cases to consider. 
 
i. Stopping Inbound Traffic: 
In this case, h[k] sends to all the computers of the Ethernet except h[i] a 
spoofed rply(ipa, hda), in which ipa is the IP address of h[i], and hda is a 
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nonexistent hardware address. Every computer that receives this spoofed 
rply(ipa, hda) message caches this nonexistent hda for h[i], and as a result, 
all future messages destined for h[i] will not be delivered to h[i].  
ii. Stopping Outbound Traffic: 
In this case, h[k] sends to h[i] a spoofed rply(ipa, hda), in which ipa is the 
IP address of the default router of the Ethernet, and hda is the hardware 
address of h[k]. Once computer h[i]’s cache is poisoned by this spoofed 
rply(ida, hda), all future outbound messages of computer h[i] are delivered 
to h[k] rather than to the default router. (The adversary h[k] can also 
forward these outbound messages of h[i] to the default router after it reads 
them. This constitutes a man-in-the-middle attack [Wha01].) 
 
In both cases, the adversary h[k] poisons the ARP caches of other 
computers such that the real next-hop destinations of their messages become 
unreachable. Therefore, the Detection of Next-Hop Failure condition of hop 
integrity is violated in this network. 
In order to counter these ARP spoofing attacks two solutions have been 
proposed recently. In one solution, a tool called ARPWATCH [LBNL] is 
proposed to monitor the activities over the Ethernet (such as the transmission of 
rqst(ipa) and rply(ipa, hda) messages over the Ethernet) and check these activities 
against a database of (IP address, hardware address) pairings. In another solution, 
permanent entries for trusted hosts [Atk97, VVI98] are permanently stored in the 
ARP caches in all computers on the Ethernet, so that rqst(ipa) and rply(ipa, hda) 
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messages are not sent over the Ethernet and ARP spoofing is prevented. Both of 
these solutions suffer from some problems. ARPWATCH supports two functions 
of ARP, namely resolving IP addresses and detecting destination failures, but it 
does not support the dynamic assignment of IP addresses. In the case of 
permanent entries for trusted hosts, detecting destination failures and dynamically 
assigning addresses are not supported. Moreover, neither of the two solutions can 
overcome transmission inducement attack as discussed in [GH03]. 
By contrast, our secure address resolution protocol, which will be 
presented in Chapter 3, can support all the three functions of ARP, and can defeat 
both ARP spoofing attack and transmission inducement attack. 
 
2.2 RESOURCE-EXHAUSTING ATTACKS 
Most known denial-of-service attacks belong to the fashion of exhausting 
the resources of the target systems. In this type of attacks, an adversary sends 
successive huge waves of messages to the target host in order to exhaust its 
computing resources and the bandwidth of its connection link. Smurf attack and 
SYN attack, as described in Chapter 1, both belong to this type. 
A common characteristic of attacks of this type is that messages inserted 
by the adversary carry wrong original sources. However, adversaries of these 
attacks put wrong original sources in their attacking messages for different 
reasons. In Smurf attack, the original source that an adversary puts in the ping 
messages is the IP address of the target host, such that each computer that 
receives a copy of this ping message sends a pong message to the target host. In 
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SYN attack, the original sources that an adversary puts in the SYN messages are 
IP addresses of hosts that are either down or unreachable at present. This is 
because if the original sources in these attacking SYN messages belong to some 
up and reachable hosts, then these hosts will receive a SYN-ACK message from 
the target host, and will return a RESET message to the target host so as to inform 
it that they did not send any SYN message to the target host before. As a result, 
the target host is able to release the resources that were reserved for the expected 
connections and foil the attack. Moreover, an adversary of any denial-of-service 
attack tends to put a forged source address in its attacking messages, such that the 
identity and location of the adversary will not be easily determined. 
The recent years have seen the emergence of distributed denial-of-service 
attack [Sko01], an even nastier type of denial-of-service attacks. This attack is 
called “distributed” because an adversary does not send out the attacking 
messages by itself. Instead, the adversary intrudes a multitude of unprotected 
hosts over the Internet and installs its attacking software in these unprotected 
hosts. These intruded hosts are called “zombies”. The adversary can launch an 
attack against a computer d on the Internet as follows. First, the adversary sends a 
command to all the zombies at the same time to initiate the software it installed in 
the zombies previously. Second, after receiving the command from the adversary, 
each zombie launches a denial-of-service attack, for example Smurf attack or 
SYN attack, against computer d. As a result, computer d is flooded by messages 
from all the zombies. 
 19
In order to curb this type of denial-of-service attacks that involve 
messages with wrong original sources, Ferguson and Senie proposed a technique 
called ingress filtering [FS00]. Using ingress filtering, each router checks whether 
the recorded source in each received message is consistent with the subnetwork 
from which the router received the message. (A router is connected to two or 
more subnetworks. It can determine which subnetwork a message comes from by 
the incoming interface of the message.) When a router receives a message, there 
are two cases for the router to consider: the received message is from a 
subnetwork with no other router connected to it, or the received message is from a 
subnetwork with one or more adjacent routers. 
If the received message is from a subnetwork with no other router 
connected to it, then the router checks if the recorded message source is consistent 
with the address prefix of the subnetwork. If so, then the message is supposedly 
from a host on that subnetwork and the router forwards the message as usual. 
Otherwise, the router discards the message. Therefore, if an adversary inserts 
messages with forged sources into a subnetwork with only one router connected 
to it, then these inserted messages will be detected and discarded by ingress 
filtering. 
However, if the received message is from a subnetwork with one or more 
adjacent routers, the situation is more complex. If the router finds that the 
recorded source of the received message is not consistent with the address prefix 
of the subnetwork from which the message is received, then there are two possible 
cases to consider: either the message is forwarded by an adjacent router, or the 
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message is inserted by a host that is connected to the subnetwork and is 
compromised by an adversary. (An adversary may try to insert its messages with 
forged sources through a compromised host on the subnetwork, hoping to 
convince the receiving router that this message is forwarded by an adjacent 
router.) Ingress filtering cannot distinguish the above two cases, therefore it is not 
effective in stopping denial-of-service attacks that insert messages into a 
subnetwork with two or more routers. 
In order for a network to counter such denial-of-service attacks that insert 
messages with forged sources into a subnetwork with two or more routers, the 
network needs to satisfy the second condition of hop integrity: Detection of 
Message Modification. That is, whenever a router q on the network receives a 
message m supposedly from an adjacent router p, router q can correctly determine 
whether message m was modified or inserted by an adversary. Our weak hop 
integrity protocol and strong hop integrity protocol, which will be presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5, can detect message modification, and therefore can detect and 
discard the messages inserted by an adversary. 
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Chapter 3 
Secure Address Resolution Protocol 
 
In this chapter, we present the secure address resolution protocol. The 
secure address resolution protocol requires a secure server connected to the 
Ethernet, and consists of two sub-protocols: an invite-accept protocol and a 
request-reply protocol. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we introduce the 
architecture of secure address resolution, and show that this architecture can 
counter ARP spoofing attacks discussed in Section 2.1. Then, in Sections 3.2 and 
3.3, we present the invite-accept protocol and the request-reply protocol 
respectively. Finally, we discuss four extensions to the secure address resolution 
protocol in Section 3.4. 
 
3.1 ARCHITECTURE OF SECURE ADDRESS RESOLUTION 
To perform secure address resolution in an Ethernet, a secure server s is 
added to the Ethernet. Then, every communication concerning address resolution 
in this Ethernet is either from s to some computer in the Ethernet, or from some 
computer in the Ethernet to s. 
The secure address resolution protocol between s and a computer h[i] in 
the Ethernet consists of two sub-protocols: the invite-accept protocol and the 
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request-reply protocol. The function of the invite-accept protocol is to allow the 
secure server s to invite the different computers in the Ethernet to register, 
periodically and securely, their IP addresses and hardware addresses in the secure 
server. The function of the request-reply protocol is to allow each computer in the 
Ethernet to request the secure server s to resolve an IP address of some other 
computer in the same Ethernet to its hardware address. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
the invite-accept protocol is between process sn in server s and process hn[i] in 
computer h[i], and the request-reply protocol is between process sr in server s and 
process hr[i] in computer h[i]. 
 
 
            Interface 
  hr[i] 
  hn[i] 
        Applications 
          Transport 
           Network 
            Interface 
    sr 
    sn 
        Applications 
          Transport 
           Network 
invite-accept protocol
Subnetwork Subnetwork
Ethernet 
write arrays 
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h[i] s
 • • • 
request-reply protocol
 
Figure 3.1: Architecture of secure address resolution. 
 
Both the invite-accept protocol and the request-reply protocol are designed 
to tolerate the actions of any adversary that happens to be on the Ethernet. We 
assume that an adversary can perform the following three types of actions a finite 
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number of times to disrupt the communications between server s and any 
computer h[i] on the Ethernet. 
 
i. Message Loss: 
After a message is sent (by a process in s or h[i]), the message is discarded 
by the adversary, and is never received (by the intended process in h[i] or 
s, respectively). 
ii. Message Modification: 
After a message is sent and before it is received, the message fields are 
arbitrarily modified by the adversary. 
iii. Message Replay: 
After a message is sent and before it is received, the message is replaced 
by a copy of an earlier message of the same type by the adversary. 
 
Note that by executing a sequence of these adversary actions, the 
adversary can launch the ARP spoofing attacks presented in Section 2.1. Let us 
consider again the scenario where an adversary computer h[k], which is on the 
same Ethernet as its target computer h[i], wants to stop the communication of h[i] 
with the outside world. First, in order to stop the inbound traffic of h[i], h[k] 
modifies some ARP reply messages that are destined to all the computers of the 
Ethernet except h[i] such that the modified ARP reply messages become rply(ipa, 
hda), in which ipa is the IP address of h[i], and hda is a nonexistent hardware 
address. Also, h[k] discards a finite number of ARP reply messages that contain 
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the IP address and the correct hardware address of h[i]. The net effect is that every 
computer that receives the spoofed rply(ipa, hda) message caches this nonexistent 
hda for h[i] for some time, and as a result, all messages destined for h[i] will not 
be delivered to h[i] for some time. Second, in order to stop the outbound traffic of 
h[i], h[k] modifies an ARP reply message destined to h[i] such that the message 
becomes rply(ipa, hda), in which ipa is the IP address of the default router of the 
Ethernet, and hda is the hardware address of h[k]. Also, h[k] discards a finite 
number of ARP reply messages that contain the IP address and the correct 
hardware address of the default router of the Ethernet. Once computer h[i]’s cache 
is poisoned by this spoofed rply(ida, hda), all future outbound messages of 
computer h[i] are delivered to h[k] rather than to the default router until the 
poison entry in h[i]’s cache expires. 
Next, we illustrate how our secure address resolution architecture counters 
the adversary actions. In our design, the invite-accept protocol and the request-
reply protocol use the following three mechanisms to tolerate the three types of 
adversary actions: 
 
i. Timeouts to Counter Message Loss: 
If a process (in s or h[i]) sends a message and does not receive a reply for 
this message for a relatively long time, the process times out and sends 
another copy of the same message or sends another message. 
ii. Shared Secrets to Counter Message Modification: 
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Server s shares a unique secret scr[i] with each computer h[i] on the 
Ethernet. This secret is used to compute an integrity check to be added to 
each message that is sent between s and h[i]. For example, assume that a 
message acpt(c, ip, hd), with three fields c, ip, and hd, is to be sent 
between s and h[i]. Then an integrity check d for this message can be 
computed as follows: 
  d := MD(c; ip; hd; scr[i]) 
where MD is a message digest function, such as MD5 [Riv92], SHA 
[NIST95], or HMAC [KBC97], and “c; ip; hd; scr[i]” is a concatenation of 
the three message fields and the shared secret. This integrity check d is 
added to the message, to become acpt(c, ip, hd, d), before sending it so 
that if the message fields are arbitrarily modified (by the adversary) to 
become acpt(c′, ip′, hd′, d′), then d′ is no loger equal to MD(c′; ip′; hd′; 
scr[i]). Thus, arbitrarily modifying the fields of a message can be detected 
by the message receiver. 
Note that shared secrets used by the protocols in our secure address 
resolution architecture are based on the following assumption: Every 
computer on the Ethernet has secure access to the secret it shares with the 
secure server and does not reveal the shared secret to any other computer 
on this Ethernet. Otherwise, if an adversary gets to know the secret shared 
between server s and computer h[i] on the Ethernet, then this adversary 
can impersonate h[i] to communicate with s, or it can impersonate s to 
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communicate with h[i], and messages sent from the adversary to s or h[i] 
will not be detected. 
iii. Nonces to Counter Message Replay: 
Before a process (in s or h[i]) sends a message that requires a reply to 
another process (in h[i] or s, respectively), the sending process attaches to 
the message a unique integer nc, called the message nonce. When the 
receiving process receives the message and prepares a reply, it attaches the 
message nonce nc to the reply. Finally, when the sending process receives 
the reply and checks that the message nonce is the same as that in the 
original message, it concludes correctly that neither the original message 
nor the reply were replaced by earlier messages (by the adversary). 
 
We argue that ARP spoofing attack cannot succeed under our secure 
address resolution architecture. Note that using our secure address resolution 
architecture, all messages regarding address resolution are exchanged between 
server s and computer h[i], rather than between computer h[i] and other 
computers on the Ethernet. Therefore, in order to launch an ARP spoofing attack 
against computer h[i], adversary h[k] has to try to modify address resolution 
messages between s and h[i]. However, the attempt by h[k] will not succeed 
because of the following two reasons. First, each message of the invite-accept 
protocol between s and h[i] is protected by an integrity check computed using the 
secret shared between s and h[i]. Thus, h[k] cannot poison the hardware address 
of h[i] stored in server s because h[k] does not know the secret shared between s 
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and h[i]. Second, each message of the request-reply protocol between s and h[i] is 
protected by an integrity check computed using the secret shared between s and 
h[i]. Thus, h[k] cannot fool h[i] by sending h[i] a forged reply message because 
h[k] does not know the secret shared between s and h[i].     
In the next two sections, we describe in some detail the two protocols: the 
invite-accept protocol and the request-reply protocol, and discuss their correctness 
proofs. 
 
3.2 THE INVITE-ACCEPT PROTOCOL 
The invite-accept protocol consists of process sn in server s and every 
process hn[i] in computer h[i]. Process sn shares a unique secret scr[i] with every 
process hn[i], and it stores the shared secrets in an input array scr[0 ..  n-1]. This 
array is defined as an input in process sn because the actions of sn can read this 
array but cannot update it. (The initial shared secret of a host can be assigned to 
this host along with its IP address when the host is added to the Ethernet. The 
shared secret can be renewed once in a long period, for example a month.) 
Process sn also maintains three variable arrays ipa[0 .. n-1], hda[0 .. n-1], 
and valid[0 .. n-1]. Array ipa[0 .. n-1] and array hda[0 .. n-1] are used to record 
the IP addresses and hardware addresses of all computers on the Ethernet. Array 
valid[0 .. n-1] is the validity count for the entries in arrays ipa[0 .. n-1] and hda[0 
.. n-1]. When sn writes ipa[i] and hda[i], valid[i] is assigned its highest possible 
value vmax. Periodically, sn decrements valid[i] by one. If the value of valid[i] 
ever becomes zero, then the current values of ipa[i] and hda[i] are no longer valid. 
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There are two types of messages in the invite-accept protocol: invite and 
accept messages. The invite messages are sent from process sn to every process 
hn[i], whereas the accept messages are sent from every process hn[i] to process 
sn. Every T seconds, process sn sends an invite message to every process hn[i]. 
Then every hn[i] replies by sending an accept message to s. 
Each invite message is of the form invt(nc, md), where nc is the unique 
nonce of the message and md is a list md[0], … , md[n-1] of message digests. 
Before sending an invt(nc, md) msg, process sn computes a unique value for nc, 
and computes every md[i] as follows: 
nc := NONCE; 
for every i, 0 ≤ i < n, md[i] := MD(nc; scr[i]) 
where NONCE is a function that when invoked returns a fresh nonce. 
When a process hn[i] receives an invt(nc, md) message, it computes the 
value MD(nc; sc) and compares the computed value with the received value md[i] 
in the message. If they are equal, then hn[i] concludes correctly that this message 
was indeed sent by sn, and sends an accept message to sn. Otherwise, hn[i] 
discards the received invite message. 
Each accept message, sent by a process hn[i], is of the form acpt(c, x, y, 
d), where c is the message nonce that hn[i] found in the last received invite 
message, x is the IP address of hn[i], y is the hardware address of hn[i], and d is 
the message digest computed by hn[i] as follows: 
d := MD(c; x; y; sc) 
where sc is the secret that h[i] shares with server s. 
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When process sn receives an acpt(c, x, y, d) message from a process hn[i], 
it checks that c equals the nonce nc in the last invite message sent by sn and that d 
is a correct digest for the accept message. If so, sn concludes correctly that the 
accept message was indeed sent by hn[i] and stores x in ipa[i] and stores y in 
hda[i]. Otherwise, sn discards the accept message. Process sn can be defined as 
follows. 
 
process sn 
inp scr : array [0 .. n-1] of integer {shared secrets} 
 T  : integer {T ≥ round trip delay between} 
{sn and each hn[i]} 
 vmax : integer 
var ipa : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 hda : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 valid : array [0 .. n-1] of 0 .. vmax 
 md : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 nc, c, d : integer 
 x, y : integer 
begin 
 timeout  (T seconds passed since this action executed last) → 
  nc := NONCE; 
  i := 0; 
  do i < n → 
   md[i] := MD(nc; scr[i]); 
   i := i + 1 
  od; 
  send invt(nc, md) to hn; 
  i := 0; 
  do i < n → 
   valid[i] := max(0, valid[i] – 1); 
   i := i + 1 
  od 
 
[] rcv acpt(c, x, y, d) from hn[i] → 
  if  c = nc  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; scr[i]) → 
   ipa[i] := x; 
   hda[i] := y; 
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   valid[i] := vmax 
  []  c ≠ nc  ∨  d ≠ MD(c; x; y; scr[i]) → 
   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
end 
 
Process sn has two actions. In the first action, sn broadcasts an invite 
message to every process hn[i] on the Ethernet every T seconds. In the second 
action, process sn receives an accept message from hn[i], checks that the message 
is correct, and if so, it stores the IP address and hardware address contained in the 
accept message in ipa[i] and hda[i]. 
Note that when sn broadcasts an invite message, it decrements the value of 
every valid[i] by one, and when sn receives an accept message from hn[i] and 
checks that the message is correct, it resets the value of valid[i] to vmax. Thus, if 
sn does not receive any accept message from hn[i] for vmax * T seconds, then 
valid[i] becomes 0 in sn. 
Process hn[i] stores the secret it shares with process sn in an input named 
sc. (Thus, the value of sc in hn[i] equals the value of scr[i] in sn.) Process hn[i] 
has two other inputs, namely ip and hd, that stores the IP address and the 
hardware address of computer h[i], respectively. Process hn[i] can be defined as 
follows. 
 
process hn[i : 0 .. n-1] 
inp sc : integer  {sc in hn[i] = scr[i] in sn} 
 ip, hd : integer 
var  e : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
c, d : integer 
begin 
 rcv invt(c, e) from sn → 
  d := MD(c; sc); 
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  if d = e[i] → 
   d := MD(c; ip; hd; sc); 
   send acpt(c, ip, hd, d) to sn 
  [] d ≠ e[i] → 
   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
end 
 
To verify the correctness of the invite-accept protocol, we can use the state 
transition diagram of this protocol in Figure 3.2. This diagram has seven nodes 
that represent all possible reachable states of the protocol. Every transition in the 
diagram stands for either a legitimate action (of process sn or process hn[i]), or an 
illegitimate action of the adversary. For convenience, each transition is labeled by 
the message event that is executed during the transition. In particular, each 
transition has a label of the form 
<event type> : <message type> 
where <event type> is one of the following: 
S stands for sending a message of the specified type 
R stands for receiving and accepting a message of the specified type 
D stands for receiving and discarding a message of the specified type 
L stands for losing a message of the specified type 
M stands for modifying a message of the specified type 
P stands for replaying a message of the specified type 
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Figure 3.2: State transition diagram of the invite-accept protocol. 
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Initially, the network starts at a state S.0 where the two channels between 
processes sn and hn[i] are empty. This state can be defined by the following 
predicate  
S.0 = ch.sn.hn[i] = < >  ∧  ch.hn[i].sn = < > 
At state S.0, exactly one action, namely the timeout action in process sn, is 
enabled for execution. Executing this action at state S.0 leads the network to state 
S.1 defined as follows: 
S.1 = ch.sn.hn[i] = <invt(c, e)>  ∧  c = nc  ∧  e[i] = md[i]  ∧   
e[i] = MD(c; scr[i])  ∧  ch.hn[i].sn = < > 
Note that in state S.1, the channel from process sn to process hn[i] has 
only one message: invt(c, e), where the following three conditions hold. First, the 
value of field c in the message equals the value of variable nc in sn. Second, the ith 
element in array e in the message equals the ith element in array md in sn. Third, 
the ith element in array e equals the message digest of the concatenation of the 
value of field c and the ith element in array scr in sn. 
At state S.1, exactly one legitimate action, namely the receive action in 
process hn[i], is enabled for execution. Executing this action at state S.1 leads the 
network to state S.2 defined as follows: 
S.2 = ch.sn.hn[i] = < >  ∧ 
 ch.hn[i].sn = <acpt(c, x, y, d)>  ∧  c = nc  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; sc) 
Note that in state S.2, the channel from process hn[i] to process sn has 
only one message: acpt(c, x, y, d), where the following two conditions hold. First, 
the value of field c in the message equals the value of variable nc in sn. Second, 
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the value of field d in the message equals the message digest of the concatenation 
of the values of fields c, x, y, and the value of input sc in hn[i]. 
At state S.2, exactly one legitimate action, namely the receive action in 
process sn, is enabled for execution. Executing this action at S.2 leads the network 
back to S.0 defined above. 
States S.0, S.1 and S.2 are called good states because the transitions 
between these states only involve the legitimate actions of processes sn and hn[i]. 
The sequence of the transitions from state S.0 to state S.1, from state S.1 to state 
S.2, and from state S.2 to state S.0, constitutes the good cycle in which the 
network performs progress. If only legitimate actions of processes sn and hn[i] are 
executed, the network will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. Next, we discuss 
the bad effects caused by the actions of an adversary, and how the network can 
recover from bad states to good states. 
First, the adversary can execute a message loss action at state S.1 or S.2. If 
the adversary executes a message loss action at S.1, the only message in the 
channel from process sn to process hn[i] is removed. If the adversary executes a 
message loss action at S.2, the only message in the channel from hn[i] to sn is 
removed. In either case, the network returns to state S.0 where both channels are 
empty. 
Second, the adversary can execute a message modification action at state 
S.1 or S.2. If the adversary executes a message modification action at S.1, the 
network moves to state M where the ith element of array e in message invt(c, e) is 
not equal to the message digest of the concatenation of c and scr[i]. This message 
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invt(c, e) will be received and discarded by hn[i] because it cannot pass the 
integrity check in the receive action of hn[i]. If the adversary executes a message 
modification action at S.2, the network moves to state M′ where the value of field 
d in message acpt(c, x, y, d) is not equal to the message digest of the 
concatenation of the values of fields c, x, y in the message and input sc in hn[i]. 
This message acpt(c, x, y, d) will be received and discarded by sn because it 
cannot pass the integrity check in the receive action of sn. In either case, the 
network returns to state S.0. 
Third, the adversary can execute a message replay action at state S.1 or 
S.2. If the adversary executes a message replay action at S.1, the network moves 
to state P where the value of field c in message invt(c,e) is not equal to the value 
of variable nc in sn, the ith element of array e in the message is not equal to the ith 
element of array md in sn, but the ith element of array e is equal to the message 
digest of the concatenation of the values of field c in the message and the ith 
element of input array scr in sn. This message invt(c, e) will be received by hn[i] 
and it will pass the integrity check in the receive action of hn[i]. Then, hn[i] sends 
a message acpt(c, x, y, d) to sn, and the network enters state P′ where the value of 
field c in message acpt(c, x, y, d) is not equal to the value of variable nc in sn. 
This message acpt(c, x, y, d) will be received and discarded by sn because it 
cannot pass the integrity check in the receive action of sn, and the network returns 
to state S.0 where both channels are empty. If the adversary executes a message 
replay action at S.2, the network moves to state P′ as described above. Then, the 
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message acpt(c, x, y, d) will be received and discarded by sn, and the network 
returns to S.0. 
From the state transition diagram, it is clear that each imposed illegitimate 
action by the adversary will eventually lead the network back to S.0, which is a 
good state. Once the network enters a good state, the network can make progress 
in the good cycle. Hence the following two theorems about the invite-accept 
protocol is proved. 
 
Theorem 3.1.  In the absence of an adversary, a network that executes the invite-
accept protocol will follow the good cycle, consisting of the transitions from state 
S.0 to state S.1, from state S.1 to state S.2, and from state S.2 to state S.0, and will 
stay in this good cycle indefinitely. 
 
Theorem 3.2.  In the presence of an adversary, a network that executes the 
invite-accept protocol will converge to the good cycle in a finite number of steps 
after the adversary finishes executing the message loss, message modification, 
and message replay actions. 
 
3.3 THE REQUEST-REPLY PROTOCOL 
Next, we outline the operation of the request-reply protocol as follows. 
When a computer h[i] wants to send a message m to any other computer h[j] on 
the same Ethernet and thus needs to resolve the IP address of h[j] into its 
corresponding hardware address, h[i] can use the request-reply protocol to send a 
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request message to server s. Then server s replies by sending a reply message to 
h[i]. If valid[j] in s is positive, which indicates h[j] has been up shortly before s 
receives the request message, s sends h[i] a reply message that contains the 
hardware address of h[j]. Otherwise, s sends h[i] a reply message with no 
hardware address in it. Therefore, h[i] does not send a message to h[j] over the 
Ethernet unless h[j] has been up shortly before the message is sent. Similarly, 
with the secure address resolution protocol suite installed in the subnetwork, 
router p does not send any message to router q over the Ethernet connecting p and 
q unless router q has been up shortly before the message is sent. Consequently, 
the Detection of Next-Hop Failure condition is attained. 
The request-reply protocol consists of process sr in server s and every 
process hr[i] in computer h[i]. Process sr in server s shares the same unique secret 
with process hr[i] in computer h[i] as shared between processes sn and hn[i] in the 
invite-accept protocol. 
There are two types of messages in the request-reply protocol: request and 
reply messages. The request messages are sent from process hr[i] to process sr, 
whereas the reply messages are sent from process sr to process hr[i]. When 
process hr[i] needs to resolve an IP address into its corresponding hardware 
address, and hr[i] is not waiting for a reply message for a previous request 
message, hr[i] sends a request message to process sr. Then sr replies by sending a 
reply message to process hr[i]. 
Each request message is of the form rqst(nc, dst, d), where nc is the unique 
nonce of the message, dst is the IP address of the destination computer process 
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hr[i] needs to resolve, and d is a message digest computed by hr[i]. Before 
sending a rqst(nc, dst, d) msg, process hr[i] computes a unique value for nc, and 
computes d as follows: 
nc := NONCE; 
d := MD(nc; dst; sc) 
When process sr receives a rqst(nc, dst, d) message, it computes the value 
MD(nc; dst; scr[i]) and compares the computed value with the received value d in 
the message. If they are equal, then sr concludes correctly that this message was 
indeed sent by hr[i], searches its database for the corresponding hardware address 
of dst, and sends a reply message to hr[i]. Otherwise, sr discards the received 
request message. 
Each reply message, sent by process sr, is of the form rply(c, x, y, d), 
where c is the message nonce that sr found in the last received request message, x 
is the IP address of the destination computer requested by hr[i], y is the 
corresponding hardware address of x, and d is the message digest computed by sr 
as follows: 
d := MD(c; x; y; scr[i]) 
where scr[i] is the secret that server s shares with computer h[i]. 
When process hr[i] receives a rply(c, x, y, d) message from process sr, it 
checks that c equals the nonce nc in the last request message sent by hr[i], that x 
equals dst in the last request message sent by hr[i], and that d is a correct digest 
for the reply message. If so, hr[i] concludes correctly that the reply message was 
indeed sent by sr and takes y as the hardware address of the destination computer. 
 39
Otherwise, hr[i] discards the reply message. Process hr[i] can be defined as 
follows. 
 
process hr[i : 0 .. n-1] 
inp sc : integer  {sc in hr[i] = scr[i] in sr} 
 t : integer 
var nc, c, d : integer 
 dst, x, y: integer 
 wait : boolean 
begin 
 ~ wait → 
  wait := true; 
  nc := NONCE; 
  dst := any; 
  d := MD(nc; dst; sc); 
  send rqst(nc, dst, d) to sr 
 
[] rcv rply(c, x, y, d) from sr → 
  if nc = c  ∧  dst = x  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; sc) → 
   {y is requested information about x} wait := false 
  [] nc ≠ c  ∨  dst ≠ x  ∨  d ≠ MD(c; x; y; sc) → 
   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
 
[] timeout  wait  ∧  (t seconds passed since first action executed last) → 
  d := MD(nc; dst; sc); 
  send rqst(nc, dst, d) to sr 
end 
 
Process hr[i] has three actions. In the first action, process hr[i] sends a 
request message to process sr while not waiting. In the second action, hr[i] 
receives a reply message from sr, and derives the hardware address of the 
destination computer. In the third action, hr[i] times out after waiting for t 
seconds, and resends the same request message to sr. 
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Note that in the second action, process hr[i] checks both field c and field x 
in message rply(c, x, y, d) to see if they are equal to the values of nc and dst 
respectively. The purpose of this double-checking is to make sure that the reply 
message corresponds to the request message for which hr[i] is waiting for a reply, 
and that the hardware address contained in the reply message corresponds to the 
IP address hr[i] needs to resolve, and also to make it harder for the adversary to 
modify the message. 
Process sr can read (but not write) the three arrays ipa[0 .. n-1], hda[0 .. n-
1], and valid[0 .. n-1] that are updated regularly by process sn of the invite-accept 
protocol. Process sr can be defined as follows. 
 
process sr 
inp scr : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 ipa : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 hda : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 valid : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
var c, d : integer 
 x, i, j : integer 
begin 
 rcv rqst(c, x, d) from hr[i] → 
  if d = MD(c; x; scr[i]) → 
   j := 0, 
   do ipa[j] ≠ x  ∧  j < n →   
j := j + 1 
od; 
if j < n  ∧  valid[j] > 0 → 
    d := MD(c; x; hda[j]; scr[i]); 
    send rply(c, x, hda[j], d) to hr[i] 
[] j = n  ∨  valid[j] = 0 → 
    d := MD(c; x; 0; scr[i]); 
    send rply(c, x, 0, d) to hr[i] 
fi 
  [] d ≠ MD(c; x; scr[i]) → 
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   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
end 
 
Process sr has only one action, in which sr receives a request message 
from process hr[i] and sends a reply message to hr[i]. 
Note that when process sr receives a request message from process hr[i], it 
first checks the integrity of the message. Then, sr searches array ipa for the IP 
address that hr[i] requests to resolve. If the requested IP address exists in array ipa 
and the validity count for it is larger than 0, then sr sends a reply message, 
containing the corresponding hardware address, to hr[i]. If the requested IP 
address does not exist in array ipa or the validity count is equal to 0, then sr sends 
a reply message, containing an empty hardware address, to hr[i]. 
To verify the correctness of the request-reply protocol, we can use the 
state transition diagram as shown in Figure 3.3. This diagram has eight states that 
represent all possible reachable states of the protocol. 
Initially, the network starts at a state S.0 where the value of variable wait 
in process hr[i] is false and the two channels between processes hr[i] and sr are 
empty. At S.0, exactly one action, namely the first action in hr[i], is enabled for 
execution. Executing this action at S.0 leads the network to state S.1, where the 
channel from hr[i] to sr has only one message rqst(c, x, d). In this message, the 
value of field c equals the value of variable nc in hr[i], the value of field x equals 
the value of variable dst in hr[i], and the value of field d equals the message digest 
of the concatenation of the values of fields c, x, and the value of input sc in hr[i]. 
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S.1 = wait  ∧
ch.hr[i].sr = <rqst(c, x, d)>  ∧  c = nc  ∧  x = dst  ∧  d = MD(c; x; sc)  ∧
ch.sr.hr[i] = < >
S.2 = wait  ∧
ch.hr[i].sr = < >  ∧
ch.sr.hr[i] = <rply(c, x, y, d)>  ∧  c = nc  ∧  x = dst  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; scr[i])
M = wait  ∧
ch.hr[i].sr = <rqst(c, x, d)>  ∧  d ≠ MD(c; x; sc)  ∧
ch.sr.hr[i] = < >
M′ = wait  ∧
ch.hr[i].sr = < >  ∧
ch.sr.hr[i] = <rply(c, x, y, d)>  ∧  d ≠ MD(c; x; y; scr[i])
P = wait  ∧
ch.hr[i].sr = <rqst(c, x, d)>  ∧  c ≠ nc  ∧  d = MD(c; x; sc)  ∧
ch.sr.hr[i] = < >
P′ = wait  ∧
ch.hr[i].sr = < >  ∧
ch.sr.hr[i] = <rply(c, x, y, d)>  ∧  c ≠ nc  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; scr[i])
L = wait  ∧  ch.hr[i].sr = < >  ∧  ch.sr.hr[i] = < >
P:rqst P:rply
 
Figure 3.3: State transition diagram of the request-reply protocol. 
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At state S.1, exactly one legitimate action, namely the receive action in 
process sr, is enabled for execution. Executing this action at S.1 leads the network 
to state S.2, where the channel from sr to hr[i] has only one message rply(c, x, y, 
d). In this message, the value of field c equals the value of variable nc in hr[i], the 
value of field x equals the value of variable dst in hr[i], and the value of field d 
equals the message digest of the concatenation of the values of fields c, x, y, and 
the ith element of input array scr in sr. 
At state S.2, exactly one legitimate action, namely the receive action in 
hr[i], is enabled for execution. Executing this action at S.2 leads the network back 
to S.0. 
States S.0, S.1 and S.2 are the good states of the request-reply protocol, 
and the sequence of the transitions from S.0 to S.1, from S.1 to S.2, and from S.2 
to S.0, constitutes the good cycle in which the network performs progress. Next, 
we discuss the bad effects caused by the actions of the adversary, and how the 
network can recover from bad states to good states. 
First, the adversary can execute a message loss action at state S.1 or S.2. If 
the adversary executes a message loss action at S.1 or S.2, the network moves to 
state L where the value of variable wait in hr[i] is true and the two channels 
between hr[i] and sr are empty. After the timeout action, the network returns to 
S.1. 
Second, the adversary can execute a message modification action at state 
S.1 or S.2. If the adversary executes a message modification action at S.1, the 
network moves to state M where the value of field d in message rqst(c, x, d) is not 
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equal to the message digest of the concatenation of the values of fields c, x in the 
message and input sc in hr[i]. This message rqst(c, x, d) will be received and 
discarded by sr because it cannot pass the integrity check. If the adversary 
executes a message modification action at S.2, the network moves to state M¢ 
where the value of field d in message rply(c, x, y, d) is not equal to the message 
digest of the concatenation of the values of fields c, x, y in the message and the ith 
element of input array scr in sr. This message rply(c, x, y, d) will be received and 
discarded by hr[i] because it cannot pass the integrity check. In either case, the 
network moves to state L next and eventually returns to S.1. 
Third, the adversary can execute a message replay action at state S.1 or 
S.2. If the adversary executes a message replay action at S.1, the network moves 
to state P where the value of field c in message rqst(c, x, d) is not equal to the 
value of variable nc in hr[i], and the value of field d equals the message digest of 
the concatenation of the values of fields c and x in the message and input sc in 
hr[i]. This message rqst(c, x, d) will be received and accepted by sr because it can 
pass the integrity check. Thus sr sends to hr[i] a message rply(c, x, y, d), and the 
network moves to state P′ where the value of field c in message rply(c, x, y, d) is 
not equal to the value of variable nc in hr[i], and the value of field d equals the 
message digest of the concatenation of the values of fields c, x, y, and the ith 
element of input array scr in sr. If the adversary executes a message replay action 
at S.2, the network moves to state P′ as well. From state P′, message rply(c, x, y, 
d) will be received and discarded by hr[i] because it cannot pass the integrity 
check, and the network moves to state L. Eventually, the network returns to S.1. 
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From the state transition diagram, it is clear that each imposed illegitimate 
action by the adversary will eventually lead the network back to S.1, which is a 
good state. Once the network enters a good state, the network can make progress 
in the good cycle. Hence the following theorem about the request-reply protocol 
is proved. 
 
Theorem 3.3.  In the absence of an adversary, a network that executes the 
request-reply protocol will follow the good cycle, consisting of the transitions 
from state S.0 to state S.1, from state S.1 to state S.2, and from state S.2 to state 
S.0, and will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. 
 
Theorem 3.4.  In the presence of an adversary, a network that executes the 
request-reply protocol will converge to the good cycle in a finite number of steps 
after the adversary finishes executing the message loss, message modification, 
and message replay actions. 
 
3.4 EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we outline four extensions of the secure address resolution 
protocol. First, we extend the protocol to support insecure address resolution for 
mobile computers that may visit an Ethernet but share no secrets with the secure 
server in that Ethernet. Second, we make the protocol more reliable by adding a 
backup server to its architecture. Third, we make the protocol perform some 
 46
system diagnosis tasks. Fourth, we make the secure server act as a server for 
several Ethernets to which the server is attached. 
3.4.1 Insecure Address Resolution 
Consider an Ethernet that has several computers h[0 .. n-1] and a secure 
server s. Assume that these computers and server use the secure address 
resolution protocol (discussed above) to resolve IP addresses to hardware 
addresses. Assume also that mobile computers h[n .. r-1] visit this Ethernet but do 
not share any secret with the secure servers. In order that computers h[n .. r-1] can 
exchange messages with the other computers on this Ethernet, h[n .. r-1] need to 
use an “insecure” version of the address resolution protocol. Thus, server s needs 
to support two versions of the address resolution protocol: secure and insecure. If 
a message is due to insecure version of the address resolution protocol, then the 
information in the message is insecure. In particular, if a message comes from or 
will be sent to one of computers h[n .. r-1], or contains resolved address of one of 
computers h[n .. r-1], then the information in the message is insecure. Otherwise, 
if the message is due to secure version of the protocol, then the information in the 
message is secure.  
The insecure version of the invite-accept protocol proceeds as follows. 
Whenever server s sends a invt(nc, md) to every computer in the Ethernet, 
computer h[j], where n ≤ j < r, replies by sending back acpt(nc, x, y, d) message, 
where d has an arbitrary value, to server s. When server s receives a acpt(nc, x, y, 
d) message from computer h[j] and notices that h[j] is one of the mobile 
computers h[n .. r-1], it concludes that the message is insecure and so it does not 
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attempt to check the correctness of the message digest d. Nevertheless, s stores in 
its database the IP address x and the hardware address y of computer h[j] along 
with an indication that this information is unreliable.  
Process sn, process hn[0 .. n-1], and process hn[n .. r-1] in the invite-
accept protocol with extension for insecure address resolution can be specified as 
follows. 
 
process sn 
inp scr : array [0 .. n-1] of integer {shared secrets} 
 T  : integer {T ≥ round trip delay between} 
{sn and each hn[i]} 
 vmax : integer 
var ipa : array [0 .. r-1] of integer {r > n} 
 hda : array [0 .. r-1] of integer 
 valid : array [0 .. n-1] of 0 .. vmax 
 md : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 nc, c, d : integer 
 x, y : integer 
 i : 0 .. r-1 
begin 
 timeout  (T seconds passed since this action executed last) → 
  nc := NONCE; 
  i := 0; 
  do i < n → 
   md[i] := MD(nc; scr[i]); 
   i := i + 1 
  od; 
  send invt(nc, md) to hn; 
  i := 0; 
  do i < n → 
   valid[i] := max(0, valid[i] – 1); 
   i := i + 1 
  od 
 
[] rcv acpt(c, x, y, d) from hn[i] → 
  if i < n → 
if  c = nc  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; scr[i]) → 
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    ipa[i] := x; 
    hda[i] := y; 
   valid[i] := vmax 
   []  c ≠ nc  ∨  d ≠ MD(c; x; y; scr[i]) → 
    {discard message} skip 
   fi 
  [] n ≤ i < r → 
if  c = nc → 
    ipa[i] := x; 
   hda[i] := y; 
   []  c ≠ nc → 
    {discard message} skip 
   fi 
  fi 
end 
 
process hn[i : 0 .. n-1] 
inp sc : integer  {sc in hn[i] = scr[i] in sn} 
 ip, hd : integer 
var  e : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
c, d : integer 
begin 
 rcv invt(c, e) from sn → 
  d := MD(c; sc); 
  if d = e[i] → 
   d := MD(c; ip; hd; sc); 
   send acpt(c, ip, hd, d) to sn 
  [] d ≠ e[i] → 
   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
end 
 
process hn[i : n .. r-1] 
inp ip, hd : integer 
var  e : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
c : integer 
begin 
 rcv invt(c, e) from sn → 
  send acpt(c, ip, hd, 0) to sn 
end 
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Note that the proof of correctness of secure version of the invite-accept 
protocol (between process sn and processes hn[0 .. n-1]) remains the same as we 
have shown in Figure 3.2. No proof can be derived for the insecure version 
(between process sn and processes hn[n .. r-1]), however, because nothing can be 
guaranteed for the messages exchanged between sn and hn[n .. r-1].  
The insecure version of the request-reply protocol proceeds as follows. 
There are two cases to consider. First, server s may receive a rqst(nc, x, d) 
message from a computer h[i], where x is the IP address of computer h[j], and 0 ≤ 
i < n. In this case, s replies by sending a rply(nc, x, y, d) message to computer 
h[i], where y is the hardware address of computer h[j], and d is computed as 
follows: if 0 ≤ j < n, then d = MD(nc; x; y; scr[i]; 1) (the last bit “1” is used to 
indicate that y is secure information); if n ≤ j < r, then d = MD(nc; x; y; scr[i]; 0) 
(the last bit “0” is used to indicate that y is insecure information). Second, server s 
may also receive a rqst(nc, x, d) message from a computer h[i], where x is the IP 
address of computer h[j], and n ≤ i < r. In this case, s replies by sending a rply(nc, 
x, y, d) message to computer h[i], where y is the hardware address of computer 
h[j], and d has an arbitrary value.  
Process hr[0 .. n-1], process hr[n .. r-1], and process sr in the request-reply 
protocol with extension for insecure address resolution can be specified as 
follows. 
 
process hr[i : 0 .. n-1] 
inp sc : integer  {sc in hr[i] = scr[i] in sr} 
 t : integer 
var nc, c, d : integer 
 dst, x, y: integer 
 wait : boolean 
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begin 
 ~ wait → 
  wait := true; 
  nc := NONCE; 
  dst := any; 
  d := MD(nc; dst; sc); 
  send rqst(nc, dst, d) to sr 
 
[] rcv rply(c, x, y, d) from sr → 
  if nc = c  ∧  dst = x  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; sc; 1) → 
   {y is secure information about x} wait := false 
[] nc = c  ∧  dst = x  ∧  d = MD(c; x; y; sc; 0) → 
   {y is insecure information about x} wait := false 
  [] nc ≠ c  ∨  dst ≠ x  ∨   
   (d ≠ MD(c; x; y; sc; 1)  ∧  d ≠ MD(c; x; y; sc; 0)) → 
   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
 
[] timeout  wait  ∧  (t seconds passed since first action executed last) → 
  d := MD(nc; dst; sc); 
  send rqst(nc, dst, d) to sr 
end 
 
process hr[i : n .. r-1] 
inp t : integer 
var nc, c, d : integer 
 dst, x, y: integer 
 wait : boolean 
begin 
 ~ wait → 
  wait := true; 
  nc := NONCE; 
  dst := any; 
  send rqst(nc, dst, 0) to sr 
 
[] rcv rply(c, x, y, d) from sr → 
  if nc = c  ∧  dst = x → 
   {y is requested information about x} wait := false 
  [] nc ≠ c  ∨  dst ≠ x → 
   {discard message} skip 
  fi 
 51
 
[] timeout  wait  ∧  (t seconds passed since first action executed last) → 
  send rqst(nc, dst, 0) to sr 
end 
 
process sr 
inp scr : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
 ipa : array [0 .. r-1] of integer 
 hda : array [0 .. r-1] of integer 
 valid : array [0 .. n-1] of integer 
var c, d : integer 
 x, i, j : integer 
begin 
 rcv rqst(c, x, d) from hr[i] → 
  if i < n → 
if d = MD(c; x; scr[i]) → 
    j := 0; 
    do ipa[j] ≠ x  ∧  j < r →   
j := j + 1 
od; 
if j < n  ∧  valid[j] > 0 → 
     d := MD(c; x; hda[j]; scr[i]; 1); 
     send rply(c, x, hda[j], d) to hr[i] 
    [] n ≤ j < r → 
     d := MD(c; x; hda[j]; scr[i]; 0); 
     send rply(c, x, hda[j], d) to hr[i] 
[] j = r  ∨  valid[j] = 0 → 
     d := MD(c; x; 0; scr[i]; 1); 
     send rply(c, x, 0, d) to hr[i] 
fi 
   [] d ≠ MD(c; x; scr[i]) → 
    {discard message} skip 
   fi 
  [] n ≤ i < r → 
j := 0; 
   do ipa[j] ≠ x  ∧  j < r →   
j := j + 1 
od; 
if (j < n  ∧  valid[j] > 0)  ∨  n ≤ j < r → 
    send rply(c, x, hda[j], 0) to hr[i] 
   [] n ≤ j < r → 
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    send rply(c, x, hda[j], 0) to hr[i] 
[] j = r  ∨  valid[j] = 0 → 
    send rply(c, x, 0, 0) to hr[i] 
fi 
  fi 
end 
 
Note that the proof of correctness of secure version of the request-reply 
protocol (between process sr and processes hr[0 .. n-1]) remains the same as we 
have shown in Figure 3.3, except that each appearance of conjunct “d = MD(c; x; 
y; scr[i])” in the predicates of S.2 and P′ needs to be replaced by “d = MD(c; x; y; 
scr[i]; 1)  ∨  d = MD(c; x; y; scr[i]; 0)”, and conjunct “d ≠ MD(c; x; y; scr[i])” in 
the predicate of M′ needs to be replaced by “d ≠ MD(c; x; y; scr[i]; 1)  ∧  d ≠ 
MD(c; x; y; scr[i]; 0)”. No proof can be derived for the insecure version (between 
process sr and processes hr[n .. r-1]), however, because nothing can be guaranteed 
for the messages exchanged between sr and hr[n .. r-1]. 
3.4.2 A Backup Server 
The main problem of the secure address resolution protocol discussed 
above is that its secure server s represents a single point of failure. This problem 
can be resolved somewhat by adding a backup server bs to the Ethernet. Initially 
server bs is configured in a promiscuous mode so that it receives a copy of every 
message sent over the Ethernet. Because server bs receives copies of all accept 
messages sent over the Ethernet, bs keeps its database up-to-date in the same way 
server s keeps its database up-to-date. (This necessitates that server bs is provided 
with all the secrets that server s shares with the computers on the Ethernet.) 
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Server bs sends no message as long as server s continues to send invite 
messages every T seconds over the Ethernet. If server bs observes that server s 
has not sent an invite message for vmax * T seconds, it concludes that server s has 
failed. In this case, bs reports the failure, and assumes the duties of s: it starts to 
send invite messages every T seconds and to send a reply message for every 
received request message. 
3.4.3 System Diagnosis 
In the address resolution protocol, the secure server s may conclude that 
some computer h[i] on the Ethernet has failed. This happens when s sends vmax 
consecutive invite messages and does not receive an accept message for any of 
them from computer h[i]. Thus, server s can be designed to report computer 
failures to the system administrator, whenever s detects such failures. In this case, 
system diagnosis becomes a side task of the secure address resolution protocol. 
3.4.4 Serving Multiple Ethernets 
The architecture of the secure address resolution protocol can be extended 
to allow s to act as a secure server for several Ethernets (rather than a single 
Ethernet) to which s is attached [CQ87]. With this extension, the computers h[0 .. 
n-1] can be distributed over several Ethernets and n can become large. In the 
extended architecture, server s sends invite messages over the different Ethernets 
at the same time, then waits to receive accept messages over the different 
Ethernets. Also, each computer on an Ethernet can request (from server s) the 
hardware address of any other computer on the same Ethernet or on a different 
Ethernet. 
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Chapter 4 
Weak Hop Integrity Protocol 
 
In this chapter and the next chapter, we present the hop integrity protocols. 
The hop integrity protocols belong to two thin layers, namely the secret exchange 
layer and the integrity check layer, that need to be added to the network layer of 
the protocol stack of each router in a network. The function of the secret exchange 
layer is to allow adjacent routers to periodically generate and exchange (and so 
share) new secrets. The exchanged secrets are made available to the integrity 
check layer, which uses them to compute and verify the integrity check for every 
data message transmitted between the adjacent routers. 
Figure 4.1 shows the protocol stacks in two adjacent routers p and q. The 
secret exchange layer has one protocol: the secret exchange protocol. This 
protocol consists of the two processes pe and qe in routers p and q, respectively. 
The integrity check layer has two protocols: the weak integrity check protocol and 
the strong integrity check protocol. The weak version consists of the two 
processes pw and qw in routers p and q, respectively. This version can detect 
message modification, but not message replay. The strong version of the integrity 
check layer consists of the two processes ps and qs in routers p and q, 
respectively. This version can detect both message modification and message 
replay. 
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Figure 4.1: Protocol stack for hop integrity protocols. 
 
In this chapter, we present the weak hop integrity protocol, which is the 
combination of the secret exchange protocol and the weak integrity check 
protocol. In the next chapter, we present the strong hop integrity protocol, which 
is the combination of the secret exchange protocol and the strong integrity check 
protocol. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we present the secret exchange 
protocol, and verify its correctness. Then, we present the weak integrity check 
protocol, and verify its correctness. 
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4.1 SECRET EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
In the secret exchange protocol, the two processes pe and qe maintain two 
shared secrets sp and sq. Secret sp is used by router p to compute the integrity 
check for each data message sent by p to router q, and it is also used by router q to 
verify the integrity check for each data message received by q from router p. 
Similarly, secret sq is used by q to compute the integrity checks for data messages 
sent to p, and it is used by p to verify the integrity checks for data messages 
received from q. 
As part of maintaining the two secrets sp and sq, processes pe and qe need 
to change these secrets periodically, say every te hours, for some chosen value te. 
Process pe is to initiate the change of secret sq, and process qe is to initiate the 
change of secret sp. Processes pe and qe each has a public key and a private key 
that they use to encrypt and decrypt the messages that carry the new secrets 
between pe and qe. A public key is known to all processes (in the same layer), 
whereas a private key is known only to its owner process. The public and private 
keys of process pe are named Bp and Rp respectively; similarly, the public and 
private keys of process qe are named Bq and Rq respectively. 
For process pe to change secret sq, the following four steps need to be 
performed. First, pe generates a new sq, and encrypts the concatenation of the old 
sq and the new sq using qe’s public key Bq, and sends the result in a rqst message 
to qe. Second, when qe receives the rqst message, it decrypts the message 
contents using its private key Rq and obtains the old sq and the new sq. Then, qe 
checks that its current sq equals the old sq from the rqst message, and installs the 
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new sq as its current sq, and sends a rply message containing the encryption of the 
new sq using pe’s public key Bp. Third, pe waits until it receives a rply message 
from qe containing the new sq encrypted using Bp. Receiving this rply message 
indicates that qe has received the rqst message and has accepted the new sq. 
Fourth, if pe sends the rqst message to qe but does not receive the rply message 
from qe for some tr seconds, indicating that either the rqst message or the rply 
message was lost before it was received, then pe resends the rqst message to qe. 
Thus tr is an upper bound on the round trip time between pe and qe. 
Note that the old secret (along with the new secret) is included in each rqst 
message and the new secret is included in each rply message to ensure that if an 
adversary modifies or replays rqst or rply messages, then each of these messages 
is detected and discarded by its receiving process (whether pe or qe). 
Process pe has two variables sp and sq declared as follows. 
 
var sp : integer 
 sq : array [0 .. 1] of integer 
 
Similarly, process qe has an integer variable sq and an array variable sp. 
In process pe, variable sp is used for storing the secret sp, variable sq[0] is 
used for storing the old sq, and variable sq[1] is used for storing the new sq. The 
assertion sq[0] ≠ sq[1] indicates that process pe has generated and sent the new 
secret sq, and that qe may not have received it yet. The assertion sq[0] = sq[1] 
indicates that qe has already received and accepted the new secret sq. Initially, 
sq[0] in pe   =   sq[1] in pe   =   sq in qe, and 
sp[0] in qe   =   sp[1] in qe   =   sp in pe. 
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Process pe can be defined as follows. (Process qe can be defined in the 
same way except that each occurrence of Rp in pe is replaced by an occurrence of 
Rq in qe, each occurrence of Bq in pe is replaced by an occurrence of Bp in qe, 
each occurrence of sp in pe is replaced by an occurrence of sq in qe, and each 
occurrence of sq[0] or sq[1] in pe is replaced by an occurrence of sp[0] or sp[1], 
respectively, in qe.) 
 
process pe 
inp Rp : integer  {private key of pe} 
 Bq : integer  {public key of qe} 
 te : integer  {time between secret exchanges} 
 tr : integer  {upper bound on round trip time} 
var sp : integer 
 sq : array [0 .. 1] of integer{initially sq[0] = sq[1] = sq in qe} 
 d, e : integer 
begin 
 timeout (sq[0] = sq[1]  ∧   
(te hours passed since rqst message sent last)) → 
   sq[1] := NEWSCR; 
   e := NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1])); 
   send rqst(e) to qe 
 
[] rcv rqst(e) from qe → 
   (d, e) := DCR(Rp , e); 
   if sp = d  ∨  sp = e  →  
sp := e; 
    e := NCR(Bq, sp); 
send rply(e) to qe 
   [] sp ≠ d  ∧  sp ≠ e  →  
{detect adversary} skip 
   fi 
 
[] rcv rply(e) from qe → 
   d := DCR(Rp, e); 
   if sq[1] = d → sq[0] := sq[1] 
   [] sq[1] ≠ d → {detect adversary} skip 
   fi 
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[] timeout (sq[0] ≠ sq[1]  ∧   
(tr seconds passed since rqst message sent last)) → 
   e := NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1])); 
   send rqst(e) to qe 
end 
 
The four actions of process pe use three functions NEWSCR, NCR, and 
DCR defined as follows. Function NEWSCR takes no arguments, and when 
invoked, it returns a fresh secret that is different from any secret that was returned 
in the past. Function NCR is an encryption function that takes two arguments, a 
key and a data item, and returns the encryption of the data item using the key. For 
example, execution of the statement 
e := NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1])) 
causes the concatenation of sq[0] and sq[1] to be encrypted using the public key 
Bq, and the result to be stored in variable e. Function DCR is a decryption 
function that takes two arguments, a key and an encrypted data item, and returns 
the decryption of the data item using the key. For example, execution of the 
statement 
d := DCR(Rp, e) 
causes the (encrypted) data item e to be decrypted using the private key Rp, and 
the result to be stored in variable d. As another example, consider the statement 
(d, e) := DCR(Rp, e) 
This statement indicates that the value of e is the encryption of the 
concatenation of two values (v0; v1) using key Rp. Thus, executing this statement 
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causes e to be decrypted using key Rp, and the resulting first value v0 to be stored 
in variable d, and the resulting second value v1 to be stored in variable e. 
To verify the correctness of the secret exchange protocol, we can use the 
state transition diagram of this protocol in Figure 4.2. This diagram has six nodes 
that represent all possible reachable states of the protocol. Every transition in the 
diagram stands for either a legitimate action (of process pe or process qe), or an 
illegitimate action of the adversary. 
Initially, the protocol starts at a state S.0, where the two channels between 
processes pe and qe are empty and the values of variables sq[0], sq[1] in pe and 
variable sq in qe are the same. This state can be defined by the following 
predicate 
S.0 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧   
sq[0] in pe = sq[1] in pe = sq in qe 
At state S.0, exactly one action, namely the first timeout action in process 
pe, is enabled for execution. Executing this action at state S.0 leads the protocol to 
state S.1 defined as follows: 
S.1 = ch.pe.qe = <rqst(e)>  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧   
e = NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1]))  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  sq[0] in pe = sq in qe 
At state S.1, exactly one legitimate action, namely the receive action (that 
receives a rqst message) in process qe, is enabled for execution. Executing this 
action at state S.1 leads the protocol to state S.2 defined as follows: 
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 S.0 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧  sq[0] in pe = sq[1] in pe = sq in qe 
 
S.1 = ch.pe.qe = <rqst(e)>  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧  e = NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1]))  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  sq[0] in pe = sq in qe 
 
S.2 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = <rply(e)>  ∧  e = NCR(Bp, sq)  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe 
  
M.1 = ch.pe.qe = <rqst(e)>  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧  e ≠ NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1]))  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  (sq[0] in pe = sq in qe  ∨  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe) 
 
M.2 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = <rply(e)>  ∧  e ≠ NCR(Bp, sq)  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  (sq[0] in pe = sq in qe  ∨  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe) 
 
L.0 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  (sq[0] in pe = sq in qe  ∨  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe) 
 
P:rqst 
R:rply 
 
 
  S.0 
timeout & 
S:rqst 
L:rqst L:rply
R:rqst & S:rply  
  S.1 
 
  S.2 
 
 M.1 
 
  L.0 
 
 M.2 
M:rply 
R:rply 
M:rqst 
R:rqst 
timeout & S:rqst 
P:rply 
 
Figure 4.2: State transition diagram of the secret exchange protocol. 
 
 
 62
S.2 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = <rply(e)>  ∧   
e = NCR(Bp, sq)  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe 
At state S.2, exactly one legitimate action, namely the receive action (that 
receives a rply message) in process pe, is enabled for execution. Executing this 
action at state S.2 leads the protocol back to state S.0 defined above. 
States S.0, S.1 and S.2 are called good states because the transitions 
between these states consist of executing the legitimate actions of the two 
processes. The sequence of transitions from state S.0 to state S.1, to state S.2, and 
back to state S.0 constitutes the good cycle of the protocol. If only legitimate 
actions of processes pe and qe are executed, the protocol will stay in this good 
cycle indefinitely. Next, we discuss the bad effects caused by the actions of an 
adversary, and how the protocol can recover from these effects. 
First, the adversary can execute a message loss action at state S.1 or S.2. If 
the adversary executes a message loss action at state S.1 or S.2, the network 
moves to a state L.0 defined as follows: 
L.0 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧ 
(sq[0] in pe = sq in qe  ∨  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe) 
At state L.0, only the second timeout action in pe is enabled for execution, 
and executing this action leads the network back to state S.1. 
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Second, the adversary can execute a message modification action at state 
S.1 or S.2. If the adversary executes a message modification action at state S.1, 
the network moves to state M.1 defined as follows: 
M.1 = ch.pe.qe = <rqst(e)>  ∧  ch.qe.pe = < >  ∧   
e ≠ NCR(Bq, (sq[0]; sq[1]))  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧  
(sq[0] in pe = sq in qe  ∨  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe) 
If the adversary executes a message modification action at state S.2, the 
network moves to state M.2 defined as follows: 
M.2 = ch.pe.qe = < >  ∧  ch.qe.pe = <rply(e)>  ∧   
e ≠ NCR(Bp, sq)  ∧ 
 sq[0] in pe ≠ sq[1] in pe  ∧ 
 (sq[0] in pe = sq in qe  ∨  sq[1] in pe = sq in qe) 
In either case, the protocol moves next to state L.0 and eventually returns 
to state S.1. 
Third, the adversary can execute a message replay action at state S.1 or 
S.2. If the adversary executes a message replay action at state S.1, the network 
moves to state M.1. If the adversary executes a message replay action at state S.2, 
the network moves to state M.2. As shown above, the protocol eventually returns 
to state S.1. 
From the state transition diagram in Figure 4.2, it is clear that each 
illegitimate action by the adversary will eventually lead the network back to state 
S.1, which is a good state. Once the network is in a good state, the network can 
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progress in the good cycle. Hence the following two theorems about secret 
exchange protocol are proved. 
 
Theorem 4.1.  In the absence of an adversary, a network that executes the secret 
exchange protocol will follow the good cycle, consisting of the transitions from 
state S.0 to state S.1, from state S.1 to state S.2, and from state S.2 to state S.0, 
and will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. 
 
Theorem 4.2.  In the presence of an adversary, a network that executes the secret 
exchange protocol will converge to the good cycle in a finite number of steps after 
the adversary finishes executing the message loss, message modification, and 
message replay actions. 
 
4.2 WEAK INTEGRITY CHECK PROTOCOL 
The main idea of the weak integrity check protocol is simple. Consider the 
case where a data(t) message, with t being the message text, is generated at a 
source src then transmitted through a sequence of adjacent routers r.1, r.2, …, r.n 
to a destination dst. When data(t) reaches the first router r.1, r.1 computes a digest 
d for the message as follows: 
d := MD(t; scr) 
where MD is the message digest function, (t; scr) is the concatenation of the 
message text t and the shared secret scr between r.1 and r.2 (provided by the 
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secret exchange protocol in r.1). Then, r.1 adds d to the message before 
transmitting the resulting data(t, d) message to router r.2. 
When the second router r.2 receives the data(t, d) message, r.2 computes 
the message digest using the secret shared between r.1 and r.2 (provided by the 
secret exchange process in r.2), and checks whether the result equals d. If they are 
unequal, then r.2 concludes that the received message has been modified, discards 
it, and reports an adversary. If they are equal, then r.2 concludes that the received 
message has not been modified and proceeds to prepare the message for 
transmission to the next router r.3. Preparing the message for transmission to r.3 
consists of computing d using the shared secret between r.2 and r.3 and storing the 
result in field d of the data(t, d) message. 
When the last router r.n receives the data(t, d) message, it computes the 
message digest using the shared secret between r.(n-1) and r.n and checks whether 
the result equals d. If they are unequal, r.n discards the message and reports an 
adversary. Otherwise, r.n sends the data(t) message to its destination dst. 
Note that this protocol detects and discards every modified message. More 
importantly, it also determines the location where each message modification has 
occurred. 
Process pw in the weak integrity protocol has two inputs sp and sq that pw 
reads but never updates. These two inputs in process pw are also variables in 
process pe, and pe updates them periodically, as discussed in the previous section. 
Process pw can be defined as follows. (Process qw is defined in the same way 
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except that each occurrence of p, q, pw, qw, sp, and sq is replaced by an 
occurrence of q, p, qw, pw, sq, and sp, respectively.) 
 
process pw 
inp sp : integer 
 sq : array [0 .. 1] of integer 
var t, d : integer 
begin 
 rcv data(t, d) from qw → 
  if MD(t; sq[0]) = d  ∨  MD(t; sq[1]) = d →   
{defined later} RTMSG 
  [] MD(t; sq[0]) ≠ d  ∧  MD(t; sq[1]) ≠ d →   
{report adversary} skip 
  fi 
    
[] true → 
{p receives data(t, d) from router other than q} 
{and checks that its message digest is correct} 
RTMSG 
 
[] true →  
{either p receives data(t) from an adjacent host or} 
{p generates the text t for the next data message} 
  RTMSG 
end 
 
In the first action of process pw, if pw receives a data(t, d) message from 
qw while sq[0] ≠ sq[1], then pw cannot determine beforehand whether qw 
computed d using sq[0] or using sq[1]. In this case, pw needs to compute two 
message digests using both sq[0] and sq[1] respectively, and compare the two 
digests with d. If either digest equals d, then pw accepts the message. Otherwise, 
pw discards the message and reports the detection of an adversary. 
The three actions of process pw use two functions named MD and NXT, 
and one statement named RTMSG. Function MD takes one argument, namely the 
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concatenation of the text of a message and the appropriate secret, and computes a 
digest for that argument. Function NXT takes one argument, namely the text of a 
message (which we assume includes the message header), and computes the next 
router to which the message should be forwarded. Statement RTMSG is defined 
as follows. 
 
if NXT(t) = p → {accept message} skip 
 [] NXT(t) = q → d := MD(t; sp); 
   send data(t, d) to qw 
[] NXT(t) ≠ p  ∧  NXT(t) ≠ q →  
{compute d as the message digest of} 
{the concatenation of t and the secret}  
{for sending data to NXT(t); forward}  
{data(t, d) to router NXT(t)} skip  
 fi 
 
To verify the correctness of the weak integrity protocol, we can use the 
state transition diagram of this protocol in Figure 4.3, which considers the channel 
from process qw to process pw. (The channel from pw to qw, and the channels 
from pw to any other weak integrity process in an adjacent router of p, can be 
verified in the same way.) This diagram has two nodes that represent all possible 
reachable states of the protocol. Every transition in the diagram stands for either a 
legitimate action (of process pw or process qw), or an illegitimate action of the 
adversary. 
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 T.0 = I  ∧  (∀data(t, d) message in ch.qw.pw, d = MD(t; sq)) 
 
M.0 = I  ∧  (∀data(t, d) message in ch.qw.pw,  
  (¬Head(data(t, d)) ⇒ d = MD(t; sq))  ∧  
(   Head(data(t, d)) ⇒ d ≠ MD(t; sq))) 
where 
I      = sq in qw = sq[0] in pw  ∨  sq in qw = sq[1] in pw 
L:data
S:data 
R:data & 
Discard 
    M.0 
M:data 
S:data
R:data & Accept
     T.0 
 
Figure 4.3: State transition diagram of the weak integrity check protocol. 
 
Note that because the weak integrity check protocol operates below the 
secret exchange protocol in the protocol stack, we can assert that (sq in qw = sq[0] 
in pw  ∨  sq in qw = sq[1] in pw) is an invariant in every state of the weak 
integrity protocol. We denote this invariant as I in the specification in Figure 4.3. 
Also note that the notation Head(data(t, d)) in the specification in Figure 4.3 is a 
predicate whose value is true iff data(t, d) is the head message of the specified 
channel. 
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Initially, the protocol starts at state T.0. At state T.0, two legitimate 
actions, namely the send action in qw that sends a data message, and the receive 
action in pw that receives a data message, can be executed. Executing either one 
of the two actions at state T.0 keeps the protocol in state T.0. 
States T.0 is the only good state in the weak integrity protocol. The 
sequence of the transitions from state T.0 to state T.0 constitutes the good cycle of 
the protocol. If only legitimate actions of processes pw and qw are executed, the 
protocol will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. Next, we discuss the bad effects 
caused by the actions of an adversary, and how the protocol can recover from 
these effects. 
First, the adversary can execute a message loss action at state T.0. If the 
adversary executes a message loss action at state T.0, the predicate that for every 
data message data(t, d) in the channel from qw to pw, d = MD(t; sq), still holds. 
Therefore, the protocol stays at state T.0. 
Second, the adversary can execute a message modification action at state 
T.0. If the adversary executes a message modification at state T.0, the protocol 
moves to state M.0. The receive and discard action executed by pw at state M.0 
leads the protocol back to state T.0. 
From the state transition diagram, it is clear that each illegitimate action 
by the adversary will eventually lead the protocol back to T.0, which is a good 
state. Once the protocol is in a good state, the protocol can progress in the good 
cycle. Hence the following two theorems about the weak integrity check protocol 
is proved. 
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 Theorem 4.3.  In the absence of an adversary, a network that executes the weak 
integrity check protocol follows the good cycle, consisting of the single transition 
from state T.0 to state T.0, and will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. 
 
Theorem 4.4.  In the presence of an adversary, a network that executes the weak 
integrity check protocol will converge to the good cycle in a finite number of 
steps after the adversary finishes executing the message loss and message 
modification actions. 
 
However, the weak integrity check protocol, while being able to detect 
and discard all modified messages, cannot detect some replayed messages. In the 
next chapter, we introduce the strong integrity protocol that is capable of 
detecting and discarding all modified and replayed messages. 
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Chapter 5 
Strong Hop Integrity Using Soft Sequence Numbers 
 
The weak hop integrity protocol presented in the previous chapter can 
detect message modification but not message replay. In this chapter, we discuss 
how to strengthen this protocol to make it detect message replay as well. We 
present the strong hop integrity protocol in two steps. First, we present a protocol 
that uses “soft sequence numbers” to detect and discard replayed data messages. 
Second, we show how to integrate this soft sequence number protocol into the 
weak integrity check protocol presented in the previous chapter to construct the 
strong integrity check protocol. The combination of the secret exchange protocol 
and the strong integrity check protocol is the strong hop integrity protocol. 
 
5.1 SOFT SEQUENCE NUMBER PROTOCOL 
Before we introduce the soft sequence number protocol, we use a simple 
protocol to illustrate the need of sequence numbers for detecting message replay. 
Consider a protocol that consists of two processes u and v. Process u continuously 
sends data messages to process v. Assume that there is an adversary that attempts 
to disrupt the communication between u and v by inserting (i.e. replaying) old 
messages in the message stream from u to v. In order to overcome this adversary, 
process u attaches an integer sequence number s to every data message sent to 
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process v. To keep track of the sequence numbers, process u maintains a variable 
nxt that stores the sequence number of the next data message to be sent by u and 
process v maintains a variable exp that stores the sequence number of the next 
data message to be received by v. We call this protocol “hard sequence number 
protocol”, because process u always remembers the next sequence number to be 
sent, and process v always remembers the next sequence number it expects to 
receive.  
To send the next data(s) message, process u assigns s the current value of 
variable nxt, then increments nxt by one. Assume that no more than L consecutive 
messages can get lost in transit. When process v receives a data(s) message, v 
compares its variable exp with s. If exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L, then v accepts the received 
data(s) message and assigns exp the value s + 1; otherwise v discards the data(s) 
message. Processes u and v of this protocol can be specified as follows. 
 
process u 
var nxt : integer {sequence number of next sent message} 
begin 
 true → send data(nxt) to v; nxt := nxt + 1 
end 
 
process v 
inp N : integer  
 L : integer      
var s : integer  {sequence number of received message} 
exp : integer  {sequence number expected next} 
begin 
 rcv data(s) from u → 
  if  (s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L)  → 
   {reject message; report an adversary} 
   skip 
  []  (exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L)  → 
   {accept message} 
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   exp := s + 1 
  fi 
end 
 
Correctness of this protocol is based on the observation that the predicate 
exp ≤ nxt holds at each (reachable) state of the protocol. However, if due to some 
fault (for example an accidental resetting of the values of variable nxt) the value 
of exp becomes much larger than value of nxt, then all the data messages that u 
sends from this point on will be wrongly discarded by v until the value of nxt 
becomes equal to the value of exp. Next, we describe how to modify this 
sequence number protocol such that the number of data(s) messages, that can be 
wrongly discarded when the synchronization between u and v is lost due to some 
fault, is at most N, for some chosen integer N that is much larger than one.  
The modification consists of adding to process v two variables c and 
cmax, whose values are in the range 0..N-1. When process v receives a data(s) 
message, v compares the values of c and cmax. If c ≠ cmax, then process v 
increments c by one (mod N) and proceeds as before (namely either accepts the 
data(s) message if exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L, or discards the message if exp > s or exp + L 
< s). Otherwise, v accepts the message, assigns c the value 0, and assigns cmax a 
random integer in the range 0..N-1. We call the modified protocol “soft sequence 
number protocol” because process v at some instants “forgets” the sequence 
number it expects to receive next, and accepts the next received sequence number 
without question. 
There are two considerations behind this modification. First, it guarantees 
that process v never discards more than N data messages when the 
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synchronization between u and v is lost due to some fault. Second, it ensures that 
the adversary cannot predict the instants when process v is willing to accept any 
received data message, and so cannot exploit such predictions by sending 
replayed data messages at those instants. 
Formally, process u and v in this protocol can be defined as follows. 
 
process u 
var nxt : integer {sequence number of next sent message} 
begin 
 true → send data(nxt) to v; nxt := nxt + 1 
end 
 
process v 
inp N : integer  
 L : integer      
var s : integer  {sequence number of received message} 
exp : integer  {sequence number expected next} 
 c, cmax: 0 .. N − 1     
begin 
 rcv data(s) from u → 
  if  (s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L)  ∧  c ≠ cmax → 
   {reject message; report an adversary} 
   c := (c + 1) mod N 
  []  (exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L)  ∨  c = cmax → 
   {accept message} 
   exp := s + 1; 
   if  c ≠ cmax → c := (c + 1) mod N 
   []  c = cmax → c := 0; 
      cmax := RANDOM(0, N − 1) 
   fi 
  fi 
end 
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5.2 STRONG INTEGRITY CHECK PROTOCOL 
Processes u and v of the soft sequence number protocol presented in 
Section 5.1 can be combined with process pw of the weak integrity check protocol 
to construct process ps of the strong integrity check protocol. A main difference 
between processes pw and ps is that pw exchanges messages of the form data(t, 
d), whereas ps exchanges messages of the form data(s, t, d), where s is the 
message sequence number computed according to the soft sequence number 
protocol, t is the message text, and d is the message digest computed over the 
concatenation (s; t; scr) of s, t, and the shared secret scr. Process ps in the strong 
integrity protocol can be defined as follows. (Process qs can be defined in the 
same way.) 
 
process ps 
inp sp : integer 
 sq : array [0 .. 1] of integer 
 N : integer 
 L : integer 
var s, t, d : integer 
 exp, nxt: integer 
 c, cmax: 0 .. N − 1 
begin 
 rcv data(s, t, d) from qs → 
  if MD(s; t; sq[0]) = d  ∨  MD(s; t; sq[1]) = d →  
   if   (s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L)  ∧  c ≠ cmax → 
    {reject message; report an adversary} 
    c := (c + 1) mod N 
   []   (exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L)  ∨  c = cmax → 
    {accept message} 
    exp := s + 1; 
    if  c ≠ cmax → c := (c + 1) mod N 
    []  c = cmax → c := 0; 
       cmax := RANDOM(0, N − 1) 
    fi 
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   fi 
  [] MD(s; t; sq[0]) ≠ d  ∧  MD(s; t; sq[1]) ≠ d → 
   {report an adversary} skip 
  fi 
 
[] true → 
{p receives a data(s, t, d) from a router other than q and} 
{checks that its encryption is correct and} 
{its sequence number is within range} 
RTMSG 
 
[] true →  
{either p receives a data(t) from adjacent host or} 
{p generates the text t for the next data message} 
  RTMSG 
end 
 
The first and second actions of process ps have a statement RTMSG that is 
defined as follows. 
 
if NXT(t) = p → {accept message} skip 
 [] NXT(t) = q → d := MD(nxt; t; sp); 
    send data(nxt, t, d) to qs; 
    nxt := nxt + 1 
[] NXT(t) ≠ p  ∧  NXT(t) ≠ q →  
{compute next soft sequence number s} 
{for sending data to NXT(t); compute d} 
{as the message digest of the concatenation} 
{of s, t and the secret for sending data to} 
{NXT(t); forward data(s, t, d) to router NXT(t)} skip  
 fi 
 
To verify the correctness of the strong integrity check protocol, we can use 
the state transition diagram of this protocol in Figure 5.1, which considers the 
channel from process qs to process ps. (The channel from ps to qs, and the 
channels from ps to any other strong integrity process in an adjacent router of p, 
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can be verified in the same way.) This diagram has four nodes that represent all 
possible reachable states of the protocol. Every transition in the diagram stands 
for either a legitimate action (of process ps or process qs), or an illegitimate action 
of the adversary. 
Note that because the strong integrity protocol operates below the secret 
exchange protocol in the protocol stack, we can assert that (sq in qs = sq[0] in ps  
∨  sq in qs = sq[1] in ps) is an invariant in every state of the strong integrity 
protocol. We denote this invariant as I in the specification in Figure 5.1. 
Initially, the protocol starts at state U.0. At state U.0, two legitimate 
actions, namely the send action in qs that sends a data message, and the receive 
action in ps that receives a data message, can be executed. Executing either one of 
the two actions at state U.0 keeps the protocol in state U.0. 
States U.0 is the only good state in the strong integrity protocol. The 
sequence of the transitions from state U.0 to state U.0 constitutes the good cycle 
of the protocol. If only legitimate actions of processes ps and qs are executed, the 
protocol will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. Next, we discuss the bad effects 
caused by the actions of an adversary, and how the protocol can recover from 
these effects. 
First, the adversary can execute a message loss action at states U.0. If the 
adversary executes a message loss action at state U.0, the predicate that for every 
data message data(s, t, d) in the channel from qs to ps, d = MD(s; t; sq), still 
holds. Therefore, the protocol stays at state U.0. 
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 P:data 
U.0 = I  ∧  (∀data(s, t, d) message in ch.qs.ps,  
                         d = MD(s; t; sq)  ∧  (Head(data(s, t, d)) ⇒ exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L in ps)) 
 
M.0 = I  ∧  (∀data(s, t, d) message in ch.qs.ps,  
              (¬Head(data(s, t, d)) ⇒ d = MD(s; t; sq))  ∧  
                         (   Head(data(s, t, d)) ⇒ d ≠ MD(s; t; sq))) 
 
P.0 = I  ∧  (∀data(s, t, d) message in ch.qs.ps,  
             d = MD(s; t; sq)  ∧   
(Head(data(s, t, d)) ⇒ s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L in ps)  ∧  c ≠ cmax in ps) 
 
P.1 = I  ∧  (∀data(s, t, d) message in ch.qs.ps,  
                          d = MD(s; t; sq)  ∧   
(Head(data(s, t, d)) ⇒ s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L in ps)  ∧  c = cmax in ps) 
where 
I     = sq in qs = sq[0] in ps  ∨  sq in qs = sq[1] in ps 
P:data
        M.0 
R:data &
Discard M:data 
S:data 
           P.0 
R:data &
Discard 
S:data
R:data & 
Accept P:data
           P.1 
S:data 
     
U.0 L:data
S:data R:data & accept
 
Figure 5.1: State transition diagram of the strong hop integrity protocol. 
 
Second, the adversary can execute a message modification action at state 
U.0 causing the protocol to move to state M.0. The receive and discard action 
executed by ps at state M.0 leads the protocol back to state U.0. 
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Third, the adversary can execute a message replay action at state U.0. 
There are two cases to consider. First, if the replayed message data(s, t, d) is too 
old such that the secret used to compute the message digest is different from the 
current value of input sq in process qs, then the protocol moves to state M.0, and 
later returns to state U.0 as discussed above. Second, if the replayed message 
data(s, t, d) is recent such that the secret used to compute the message digest is 
equal to the current value of input sq in process qw, then the protocol moves 
either to state P.0 or to state P.1. With a high probability of (cmax – 1) / cmax, the 
protocol moves to state P.0, and the replayed message will be received and 
discarded by ps because the value of field s in the message tells that the message 
is replayed. With a probability of 1 / cmax, the protocol moves to state P.1, and 
the replayed message will be received and accepted. In both cases the protocol 
returns to state U.0. 
From the state transition diagram, it is clear that each illegitimate action 
by the adversary will eventually lead the protocol back to U.0, which is a good 
state. Once the protocol is in a good state, the protocol can progress in the good 
cycle. Moreover, if the adversary replays a recent data message, the replayed 
message will be detected and discarded with the high probability (cmax – 1) / 
cmax. Hence the following two theorems about the strong integrity check protocol 
is proved. 
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Theorem 5.1.  In the absence of an adversary, a network that executes the strong 
integrity check protocol follows the good cycle, consisting of the single transition 
from state U.0 to state U.0, and will stay in this good cycle indefinitely. 
 
Theorem 5.2.  In the presence of an adversary, a network that executes the secret 
exchange protocol will converge to the good cycle in a finite number of steps after 
the adversary finishes executing the message loss and message modification 
actions, and will converge to the good cycle in a finite number of steps with a 
high probability of (cmax – 1) / cmax after the adversary finishes executing the 
message replay actions. 
 
The protocols used by the weak hop integrity protocol and the strong hop 
integrity protocol have several novel features that make them correct and 
efficient. First, whenever the secret exchange protocol attempts to change a secret, 
it keeps both the old secret and the new secret until it is certain that the integrity 
check of any future message will not be computed using the old secret. Second, 
the integrity check protocol computes a digest at every router along the message 
route so that the location of any occurrence of message modification can be 
determined. Third, the soft sequence number protocol makes the strong hop 
integrity protocol tolerate any loss of synchronization. 
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Chapter 6 
Strong Hop Integrity Using Hard Sequence Numbers 
 
Recall that in the strong hop integrity protocol presented in Chapter 5, we 
use soft sequence numbers to achieve strong hop integrity. We call those 
sequence numbers “soft” because at some random instants the receiving process 
forgets the last kept sequence number and accepts the newest sequence number 
from the sending process. There are two considerations behind the designing of 
soft sequence numbers. First, we want to limit the number of discarded messages 
during the period when the sending process and the receiving process lose 
synchronization of their sequence numbers. Therefore, we make the receiving 
process accept the newest sequence number from the sending process once in a 
while, such that the two processes can regain synchronization soon. Second, we 
do not want to let an adversary easily guess the instant at which the receiving 
process will accept the next sequence number. If the adversary can guess the 
instant of acceptance correctly, it can make the receiving process accept a 
replayed sequence number at this instant and replay more messages afterward. 
Therefore, we randomize the instant of acceptance.  
Soft sequence numbers help achieve strong hop integrity almost 
flawlessly. The only flaw, however, is that there is still a slight chance that an 
adversary might correctly guess the instant of acceptance even though the instant 
is randomized. An alternative to avoid this slight possibility is to use hard 
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sequence numbers to achieve strong hop integrity, such that the two processes 
stick to their sequence numbers and the adversary has no chance to try its luck. 
However, one problem with hard sequence numbers is that the sending process 
and the receiving process will lose synchronization of their sequence numbers 
when a reset occurs.  In one case as stated in Section 5.1, the receiving process 
may discard a lot of fresh data messages after the sending process wakes up from 
a reset. In another case as will be shown in Section 6.1, the receiving process may 
accept replayed data messages after the receiving process wakes up from a reset. 
We do not want any one of the two bad cases to occur, and therefore we need to 
first solve the problems due to resets before hard sequence numbers can be 
exploited.  
In this chapter, we propose a reset-tolerant version of hard sequence 
numbers, such that hard sequence numbers can be used as a substitute of soft 
sequence numbers to achieve strong hop integrity. This chapter is organized as 
follows. In Section 6.1, we review the hard sequence number protocol, which was 
first presented in Section 5.1, and elaborate the problems with this protocol in 
presence of resets. Then in Section 6.2, we discuss how the two operations, 
“SAVE” and “FETCH”, can be added to make the hard sequence number protocol 
tolerate resets, and formally specify the new protocol. We show in Section 6.3 
that the new protocol can converge to the resynchronization of the two processes 
after a reset occurred, and we show in Section 6.4 how “SAVE” and “FETCH” 
can be applied in the strong hop integrity protocol as an alternative of soft 
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sequence numbers. Finally, we discuss tradeoffs between soft sequence numbers 
and hard sequence numbers in Section 6.5. 
 
6.1 HARD SEQUENCE NUMBER PROTOCOL 
In Section 5.1, we presented a hard sequence number protocol. In that 
protocol which consists of a sending process u and a receiving process v, process 
u attaches an integer sequence number s to every data message sent to process v 
in order to overcome an adversary that replays old messages in the message 
stream from u to v. Process u maintains a variable nxt that stores the sequence 
number of the next data message to be sent, and process v maintains a variable 
exp that stores the sequence number of the next data message to be received. To 
send the next data(s) message, process u assigns s the current value of variable 
nxt, then increments nxt by one. When process v receives a data(s) message, v 
compares its variable exp with s. If exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L, where L is the maximum 
number of consecutive messages that can get lost in transit, then v accepts the 
received message and assigns exp the value s + 1; otherwise v discards the 
message. Processes u and v of this protocol were specified as follows. 
 
process u 
var nxt : integer {sequence number of next sent message} 
begin 
 true → send data(nxt) to v; nxt := nxt + 1 
end 
 
process v 
inp N : integer  
 L : integer      
var s : integer  {sequence number of received message} 
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exp : integer  {sequence number expected next} 
begin 
 rcv data(s) from u → 
  if  (s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L)  → 
   {reject message; report an adversary} 
   skip 
  []  (exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L)  → 
   {accept message} 
   exp := s + 1 
  fi 
end 
 
The hard sequence number protocol presented above can be used to detect 
replayed messages when process v stays up and no reset occurs to it. However, if 
process v encounters a reset, this guarantee will not hold. In this case, unbounded 
number of replayed messages can be accepted by v after v wakes up from the 
reset. Moreover, in another case when process u in the protocol is reset and wakes 
up later, unbounded number of fresh messages from u can be discarded by v. In 
the following three paragraphs, we elaborate how the two bad possibilities can 
occur. 
First, consider the case where process u is reset and wakes up later. When 
u wakes up from a reset, u has forgotten the last nxt that it will use on the next 
message to be sent to v. Thus u resumes its operation with nxt set to 0, and the 
next fresh message p sends to q will be data(0), and the next fresh message p 
sends to q will be data(1), and so on. Suppose the current value of variable exp in 
v is y, which is unbounded. In this case, all fresh messages sent from u to v with 
sequence numbers less than y will be regarded as replayed messages and 
discarded by v.  
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Next, consider the case where process v is reset and wakes up later. When 
v wakes up from a reset, v has lost previous information about its variable exp. 
Thus v resumes its operation with exp set to 0, and any (positive) sequence 
number received next by v will be accepted by v. Suppose the last fresh sequence 
number received by v before the reset is x, which is unbounded. In this case, an 
adversary can replay in ascending order all the messages with sequence numbers 
within the range from 1 to x, and all these replayed messages will be 
unsuspectedly accepted by v. 
Last, consider the case where both process u and process v are reset and 
wake up later. When u wakes up from a reset, u resumes its operation in the 
protocol with nxt set to 0. When v wakes up from a reset, v resumes its operation 
with exp set to 0. In this case, an adversary gets the chance to replay messages 
sent before the reset, and the adversary can disrupt the communication between u 
and v if the adversary replays messages with sequence numbers larger than the 
current value of nxt in u and convinces v to set its variable exp to exceed nxt in u. 
In the next section, we propose two operations, “SAVE” and “FETCH”, 
that can be added to the hard sequence number protocol to help the two processes 
regain synchronization of their sequence numbers after a reset occurred to one or 
both of them. 
 
6.2 A PROTOCOL WITH SAVE AND FETCH OPERATIONS 
As we have shown, the hard sequence number protocol is susceptible to 
reset because computer u (or v) forgets the last sent (or received) sequence 
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number after a reset occurs to it. Therefore, we propose two operations, “SAVE” 
and “FETCH”, which can be used to somewhat “remember” the sequence number 
and thus can protect the communication between u and v from the impact of 
resets. The functions of SAVE and FETCH are straightforward. When the SAVE 
operation is executed at a computer, the last sequence number kept in the memory 
of that computer will be stored in the persistent memory of that computer. We 
assume that the content of the persistent memory of a computer will not be 
corrupted or erased by a reset of that computer; an example of persistent memory 
is a hard disk. When the FETCH operation is executed at a computer, the last 
stored sequence number will be loaded from the persistent memory into the 
memory. (SAVE and FETCH can be implemented by write-to-file and read-from-
file operations in an operating system.) 
SAVE and FETCH can be used in designing a new hard sequence number 
protocol that can avoid the impact of resets. A computer that executes the hard 
sequence number protocol can regularly execute SAVE to store a copy of a recent 
sequence number in its persistent memory. If this computer is reset and wakes up 
shortly, then although the last sequence number kept in its memory has been 
forgotten, this computer can execute FETCH to reload the sequence number 
stored in its persistent memory into its memory, such that this computer does not 
need to restart its sequence number from 0. 
To make sure the new protocol is correct, however, two considerations 
need to be addressed before the reloaded sequence number can be used for the 
next sent (or received) message of the resumed traffic. Firstly, the execution of 
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SAVE takes some time, during which the computer can still send (or receive) 
messages. Hence there can be a gap between the reloaded sequence number 
(which is the last stored sequence number) and the sequence number of the last 
message sent (or received) by this computer before the reset. If a computer that 
plays the sender uses the reloaded sequence number directly and the size of the 
gap between the reloaded sequence number and the last sent sequence number 
before the reset is n, then the first n sent messages will be regarded as replayed 
messages by the receiver and will be discarded. If a computer that plays the 
receiver uses the reloaded sequence number directly, then an adversary can replay 
old messages whose sequence numbers are in the gap between the reloaded 
sequence number and the last received sequence number. These replayed 
messages will be accepted by the receiver because their sequence numbers look 
fresh to the receiver. In order to avoid these bad possibilities, a leap number 
should be added to the reloaded sequence number to leap over the gap before it 
can be used. This leap number must be large enough to ensure that after adding it 
to the reloaded sequence number, the resulting new sequence number is larger 
than all previously used sequence numbers. We will discuss how large the leap 
number should be in the next section. 
Secondly, another reset can occur to the same computer that just waked up 
and has not yet executed the first SAVE after the last reset. In this case, those 
sequence numbers that have been used before the second reset occurs will be 
reused (or can be replayed) after the computer wakes up from the second reset. To 
avoid this problem, the computer should first execute a SAVE after the leap 
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number is added to the reloaded sequence number. If this computer plays the 
sender, it will wait for the SAVE to finish before it sends the next message. If this 
computer plays the receiver, it will temporarily keep the messages that are 
received before the SAVE finishes in a buffer. After the SAVE completes its 
execution, messages kept in the buffer will be either delivered or discarded based 
on their sequence numbers. 
Moreover, we have to decide how frequently the SAVE operation should 
be executed. On one hand, we do not want to execute SAVE too frequently 
because this can generate too much overhead. On the other hand, we do not want 
to execute SAVE too infrequently so that the saved sequence number is not recent 
enough. Our choice of the interval between two SAVEs is the maximum number 
of messages that can be sent (or received) during the execution time of SAVE. 
(For example, on a Pentium III 730-MHz machine running Linux 2.4.18, a write-
to-file operation takes 100µs and sending a 1000-byte message takes 4µs on 
average. In this case, we can set the interval between two SAVEs to be at least 
25.) Note that we measure the interval between two SAVEs in terms of the 
number of messages, rather than in terms of time, because the rate of message 
generation may change over time. At some time, the rate of message generation 
can be very low. In this case, measuring the interval in terms of time leads to 
wasteful SAVEs because when the interval to the next SAVE expires, the 
sequence number has not advanced much since the last SAVE was executed. Note 
also that the amount of time taken by every execution of SAVE can be different 
according to the current load of CPU. Therefore, we pick a reasonable upper 
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bound of the execution time of SAVE, and determine the maximum number of 
messages that can be sent (or received) during this amount of time. 
Next, we present the new hard sequence number protocol augmented with 
SAVE and FETCH. The new process u has two inputs Ku and Tu, and has two 
additional variables ln and wait. Ku is the interval between the two stored 
sequence numbers of two consecutive SAVE operations in process u. Tu is the 
execution time of a SAVE operation at u. Variable ln is the last stored sequence 
number. Variable wait is a boolean that is set to true only when process u wakes 
up after a reset and is storing the new sequence number resulting from adding the 
leap number to the reloaded sequence number. The new process u can be 
specified as follows. 
 
process u 
inp Ku, Tu : integer 
var nxt, ln : integer 
 wait : boolean 
begin 
 ~ wait →  
  send data(nxt) to v; 
  nxt := nxt + 1; 
  if  nxt ≥ Ku + ln  → ln := nxt; 
     SAVE(ln) {will be executed} 
       {in background} 
  []  nxt < Ku + ln  → skip 
  fi 
 
[] {system is reset and wakes up} → 
  FETCH(nxt); 
  SAVE(nxt + 2Ku); 
  wait := true; 
  activate timeout action after Tu time units 
 
[] timeout →  
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wait := false; 
  nxt := nxt + 2Ku; 
  ln := nxt 
end 
 
In the first action of process u, if u is not waiting for a SAVE that executes 
after a FETCH to finish, u can send the next message data(nxt) to process v and 
increment nxt by 1. Meanwhile, u also checks whether nxt has become Ku greater 
than the last stored sequence number, ln. If so, u executes SAVE to store nxt into 
persistent memory. (This SAVE should be executed in the background so that it 
does not block the normal communication between u and v.) In the second action, 
when u wakes up after a reset, u executes FETCH to reload the last stored 
sequence number, executes SAVE to store the result of the reloaded sequence 
number adding the leap number, and sets off a timer waiting for the SAVE to 
finish. In the third action, the timer expires after Tu time units (which means that 
the SAVE should have finished), so u stops waiting and sets nxt to its new value. 
Since variable wait has been set to false, the first action is enabled again and u can 
send the next message data(nxt) to v. 
The new process v that supports SAVE and FETCH has two additional 
inputs Kv and Tv, and four additional variables le, cnt, wait, and buff. Kv is the 
interval between the two stored sequence numbers of two consecutive SAVE 
operations in process v. Tv is the execution time of a SAVE operation at v. 
Variable le is the last stored sequence number. Variable cnt keeps track of the 
number of good messages received after a regular SAVE was executed last. 
Variable wait is a boolean that is set to true only when process v wakes up after a 
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reset and is storing the new sequence number resulting from adding the leap 
number to the reloaded sequence number. Variable buff is an array that buffers 
the sequence numbers received while a SAVE that executes after a FETCH has 
not yet finished. The new process v can be specified as follows. 
 
process v 
inp  Kv, Tv : integer 
var exp, le : integer 
 s, i : integer 
 cnt : integer 
 wait : boolean 
finish : boolean 
buff : array [integer] of integer {initially all entries are 0} 
begin 
 rcv data(s) from u → 
  if  ~ wait  → 
   if  s < exp  ∨  s > exp + L  →  
{reject message; report an adversary} skip 
   []  exp ≤ s ≤ exp + L  → 
    exp, cnt := s + 1, cnt + 1; 
   fi 
  []  wait  → 
   i , finish := 0, false; 
   do  buff[i] ≠ 0 ∧ ~ finish  → 
    if  buff[i] = s  → {discard data(s)} 
       finish := true 
    []  buff[i] ≠ s  → i := i + 1 
    fi 
   od; 
   if  ~ finish  → buff[i] := s 
   []  finish  → skip 
   fi 
  fi; 
if  cnt ≥ Kv ∧ exp ≥ Kv + le  → le, cnt := exp, 0; 
    SAVE(exp) 
[]  cnt < Kv ∨ exp < Kv + le  → skip 
  fi  
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[] {system is reset and wakes up} → 
  FETCH(exp); 
  SAVE(exp + 2Kv); 
  wait := true; 
  activate timeout action after Tv timeunits 
 
[] timeout →  
wait := false; 
  exp := exp + 2Kv; 
  le, cnt := exp, 0; 
  i := 0; 
  do  buff[i] ≠ 0  → 
   if  buff[i] < exp  → {discard data(buff[i])} skip 
   []  buff[i] ≥ exp  →  
{deliver data(buff[i])} 
exp, cnt := buff[i], cnt + 1; 
   fi; buff[i], i := 0, i + 1 
  od 
end  
 
There are three actions in process v. In the first action, v receives data(s) 
from u and checks whether it is waiting for a SAVE that executes after a FETCH 
to finish. If v is not waiting, then v decides whether to discard or deliver the 
message according to the value of s and the value of exp. If v is waiting, then v 
keeps the message in a temporary buffer. Meanwhile, v also checks whether it has 
received at least Kv messages since last SAVE and whether exp has become at 
least Kv greater than the last stored sequence number, le. If so, q executes SAVE 
to store exp into persistent memory. In the second action, when v wakes up after a 
reset, v executes FETCH to reload the last stored sequence number, executes 
SAVE to store the new sequence number resulting from adding the leap number 
to the reloaded sequence number, and sets off a timer waiting for the SAVE to 
finish. In the third action, the timer expires after Tv time units (which means that 
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the SAVE should have finished), so v stops waiting and sets exp to its new value. 
Then, v delivers the buffered messages whose sequence numbers are at least exp, 
and discards the other buffered messages whose sequence numbers are less than 
exp. 
 
6.3 CONVERGENCE OF NEW HARD SEQUENCE NUMBER PROTOCOL 
After we present the new hard sequence number protocol, we are ready to 
show why the sending process u or the receiving process v in this protocol can 
converge to a fresh sequence number after a reset. Our objective is to show that 
after adding a leap number to the reloaded sequence number, the resulting new 
sequence number is larger than the last sequence number used before the reset 
occurs, hence no old sequence number can be reused to send fresh message and 
no replayed message will be accepted by the receiver. We analyze the 
aforementioned two cases: when a reset occurs at the sending process u and when 
a reset occurs at the receiving process v. (From the analysis of the two cases it is 
straightforward to verify the third case when both process u and process v are 
reset.) After showing that the new sequence number used after the reset is 
guaranteed to be fresh, we show that the following two conditions hold under the 
new protocol. First, when process u is reset, a bounded number of sequence 
numbers will be lost but no fresh message will be discarded by process v if no 
message reorder occurs. Second, when process v is reset, the number of discarded 
fresh messages is bounded. 
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First, we analyze the case when a reset occurs at process u. Assume that 
process u is executing SAVE to store the sequence number nxt into persistent 
memory, and that a reset occurs before the next SAVE starts. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
this case when a reset occurs at process u. 
 
s s+t
SAVE(s-Ku) 
ends 
SAVE(s) 
starts 
s+Ku
SAVE(s)
ends 
Reset 
occurs 
here 
SAVE(s+Ku) 
starts 
t (t < Ku) 
Reset 
occurs 
here 
sequence 
number 
at process u 
or
s+t′
t′ (t′ < Ku)
 
Figure 6.1: Analysis of reset occurring at process u. 
 
From Figure 6.1, there are two possible cases to consider: the reset occurs 
before the current SAVE finishes, or the reset occurs after the current SAVE 
finishes. To check the first case, suppose the reset occurs at sequence number s + 
t, where t < Ku because the next sequence number to be stored will be s + Ku. The 
sequence number fetched by u after it wakes up is s – Ku, as SAVE(s) has not 
completed. The gap between the reset sequence number and the fetched sequence 
number can be computed by 
(s + t) – (s – Ku)  ≤  (s + Ku) – (s – Ku)  =  2Ku 
To check the second case, suppose the reset occurs at s + t′, where t′ < Ku. 
The sequence number fetched by u after it wakes up is s, as SAVE(s) has 
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completed. The gap between the reset sequence number and the fetched sequence 
number can be computed by 
(s + t′) – s  ≤  (s + Ku) – s  =  Ku 
Therefore, if we add a leap number of 2Ku to the fetched sequence 
number, as we did in the specification of process u, the next sequence number 
used by u is guaranteed to be fresh. 
Second, we analyze the case when a reset occurs at process v. Assume that 
process v is executing SAVE to store the sequence number r into persistent 
memory, and that a reset occurs before the next SAVE starts. Figure 6.2 illustrates 
this case when a reset occurs at process v. 
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Figure 6.2: Analysis of reset occurring at process v. 
 
From Figure 6.2, there are two possible cases to consider: the reset occurs 
before the current SAVE finishes, or the reset occurs after the current SAVE 
finishes. To check the first case, suppose the reset occurs at sequence number r + 
t, where t < Kv because the next sequence number to be stored will be r + Kv. The 
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sequence number fetched by q after it wakes up is r – Kv, as SAVE(r) has not 
completed. The gap between the reset sequence number and the fetched sequence 
number can be computed by 
(r + t) – (r – Kv)  ≤  (r + Kv) – (r – Kv)  =  2Kv 
To check the second case, suppose the reset occurs at r + t′, where t′ < Kv. 
The sequence number fetched by v after it wakes up is r, as SAVE(r) has 
completed. The gap between the reset sequence number and the fetched sequence 
number can be computed by 
(r + u) – r  ≤  (r + Kv) – r  =  Kv 
Therefore, if we add a leap number of 2Kv to the fetched sequence 
number, as we did in the specification of process v, it is guaranteed that v will not 
accept any replayed message. 
Next, we verify that the following two conditions hold under the new 
protocol. 
 
i. When the sender is reset, a bounded number of fresh sequence numbers 
will be lost but no fresh message will be discarded by the receiver if no 
message reorder occurs.  
Note that process u may lose some fresh sequence numbers after a reset 
because u adds a leap number 2Ku to the reloaded sequence number. 
Suppose s-Ku is the last stored sequence number when a reset occurs at u. 
Then when u wakes up, u resumes with sequence number s+Ku because u 
first reloaded s-Ku and added 2Ku to it. The worst case that can occur is s-
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Ku+1 has not been used by p when a reset occurs. In this case, u loses 2Ku 
fresh sequence numbers because u resumes with s+Ku and all numbers 
between s-Ku and s+Ku become unusable. Therefore, the total number of 
lost sequence number is bounded by 2Ku. Moreover, since s+Ku is larger 
than all previously used sequence numbers, no fresh message will be 
discarded by the receiver unless any fresh message sent after the reset 
arrives earlier than any fresh message sent before the reset.  
ii. When the receiver is reset, the number of discarded fresh messages is 
bounded. 
Note that process v may discard some fresh messages after a reset because 
q adds a leap number 2Kv to the reloaded sequence number. Suppose r-Kv 
is the last stored sequence number when a reset occurs at v. Then when v 
wakes up, v resumes with sequence number r+Kv because v first reloaded 
r-Kv and added 2Kv to it. The worst case that can occur is that r-Kv+1 has 
not been received by v when a reset occurs. In this case, v may discard at 
most 2Kv fresh messages if no message loss occurs, because v resumes 
with r+Kv, and all fresh messages with sequence numbers between r-Kv 
and r+Kv will be regarded as replayed messages by v. Therefore, the total 
number of discarded fresh messages is bounded by 2Kv. 
 
6.4 APPLICATION OF SAVE AND FETCH IN STRONG HOP INTEGRITY 
PROTOCOL 
In the above discussion, we have shown that the sending process u or the 
receiving process v in the new hard sequence number protocol, with the help of 
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SAVE and FETCH, can converge to a fresh sequence number after a reset. Next, 
we discuss how SAVE and FETCH can be integrated with the strong integrity 
check protocol, such that the protocol can recover from reset. 
To integrate SAVE and FETCH with the strong integrity check protocol, 
the following four steps should be followed. First, in the first action of process ps 
in the protocol, we need to add statements to periodically execute SAVE, and add 
statements to put incoming messages in a buffer when ps is waiting for a SAVE 
that executes after a FETCH to finish. Second, in the RTMSG statement, we also 
need to add a statement to periodically execute SAVE. Third, we need to add an 
action to process ps to execute FETCH and SAVE when process ps wakes up 
from a reset. Fourth, we need to add a timeout action to set up the sequence 
number properly after a post-reset SAVE finishes its execution. The new strong 
integrity check protocol augmented with SAVE and FETCH can be specified as 
follows. 
With the above changes made to the strong integrity check protocol, 
SAVE and FETCH can substitute soft sequence numbers, and make the strong 
integrity check protocol tolerate resets. A similar version of SAVE and FETCH 
operations has already been applied in the anti-replay window protocol in IPsec to 
make the protocol tolerate resets [HGE03], such that security associations (SA) 
that are affected by resets do not need to be deleted and reestablished as proposed 
in previous works [HBR01, KK00]. 
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6.5 TRADEOFFS BETWEEN SOFT SEQUENCE NUMBERS AND HARD SEQUENCE 
NUMBERS 
Although both soft sequence numbers and hard sequence number can be 
used to achieve strong hop integrity, the two approaches are different and each of 
them has its own advantages and disadvantages. In this section, we discuss the 
tradeoffs between soft sequence numbers and hard sequence numbers. 
First, we discuss the implementation complexity of the two approaches. 
Soft sequence numbers are easier to implement because they does not require any 
write or read operation and do not require any extra memory. By contrast, 
implementation of hard sequence numbers requires write and read operations, 
namely SAVE and FETCH, and a real-time timeout for executing SAVE after 
FETCH. Moreover, a good upper bound of the number of sent message and a 
good upper bound of the number of received message during the execution delay 
of SAVE are also needed by hard sequence numbers. 
Second, we discuss the degrees of security of the two approaches. Soft 
sequence numbers can only provide high, but not complete, protection against 
message replay attacks. This is because there is a small chance that an adversary 
may correctly guess the point that the receiving process accepts next received 
sequence number. By contrast, hard sequence numbers can provide complete 
protection against message replay attacks, because both the sending process and 
the receiving process stick to their own sequence number, and an adversary has no 
chance to try its luck. 
Third, we discuss the stabilization properties of the two approaches. Soft 
sequence number protocol is a self-stabilizing protocol. When a reset occurs to 
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either the sending process or the receiving process, the two processes can 
resynchronize their sequence numbers after waking up from the reset without 
knowing the occurrence of the reset. By contrast, hard sequence number protocol 
is not stabilizing. It is necessary that the process that wakes up from a reset knows 
that it was reset, so that it will execute FETCH to get the last stored sequence 
number. 
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Chapter 7 
Other Benefits of Hop Integrity 
 
In the last four chapters, we presented three protocols in the hop integrity 
protocol suite, namely secure address resolution protocol, weak hop integrity 
protocol, and strong hop integrity protocol. They can be used to counter most 
denial-of-service attacks, because they satisfy the three conditions of hop integrity 
and therefore can discard most denial-of-service attack messages at their first 
hops. In our investigation, however, we discovered that hop integrity can be used 
to solve other network security problems besides preventing denial-of-service 
attacks.  
In this chapter, we present three other applications of hop integrity. In 
Section 7.1, we present an application of hop integrity in the mechanism of 
mobile IP. In Section 7.2, we present an application of hop integrity in the 
mechanism of multicast. Then in Section 7.3, we discuss how to make routing 
protocols more secure. In each section, we first give an overview of the 
mechanism itself. Then, we discuss a network security problem that arises due to 
this mechanism. Finally, we show how hop integrity can be used to solve the 
problem.  
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7.1 MOBILE IP 
Mobile IP [Per02] is a mechanism designed to accommodate the 
communication need of mobile computers. According to IP version 4, the IP 
address of a computer uniquely identifies the computer’s point of attachment to 
the Internet. Therefore, when a mobile computer visits a foreign subnetwork, this 
computer must change its IP address such that messages destined to this computer 
can be delivered to it. However, changing IP address along with the change of 
location makes a computer lose its current transport and application layer 
connections, because higher-layer connections are dependent on the computer’s 
IP address. Mobile IP provides the feature that a mobile computer can keep its IP 
address by registering a foreign agent in the foreign subnetwork with the home 
agent in its home subnetwork. The foreign agent registered by the mobile 
computer then works with the home agent to accomplish the delivery of IP 
messages destined to the mobile computer. 
According to mobile IP, while a mobile computer c is visiting a foreign 
subnetwork F, IP messages destined to mobile computer c are routed indirectly, 
and IP messages generated at mobile computer c are routed directly. The indirect 
routing of an IP message destined to c proceeds in three steps. First, the IP 
message is routed toward the home subnetwork H of c and is intercepted by the 
home agent ha of c in its home subnetwork H. Second, ha forwards the message 
in a tunnel to the foreign agent fa of c in the foreign subnetwork F. Third, fa 
forwards the IP message over F to mobile computer c. This procedure of indirect 
routing is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: Indirect routing in mobile IP. 
 
The direct routing of an IP message generated at the mobile computer 
proceeds in two steps. First, mobile computer c forwards the IP message over the 
foreign subnetwork F to the foreign agent fa. Second, fa and all subsequent 
routers forward the IP message towards its intended ultimate destination. 
However, the aforementioned direct routing causes the following serious 
problem. When foreign agent fa forwards for mobile computer c a message m to 
next router q, q applies ingress filtering to m and discovers that the original source 
of m (namely mobile computer c) is not consistent with where m came from 
(namely foreign agent fa). Thus, q ends up discarding m although m is a 
legitimate message. This problem is illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Problem with direct routing in mobile IP. 
 
In RFC 3024 [Mon01], reverse tunneling for mobile IP was proposed to 
solve this problem. This scheme, designed to be symmetric to indirect routing on 
purpose, requires that every IP message generated at mobile computer c is first 
forwarded in a tunnel to the home agent ha of the mobile computer, and then 
routed toward its ultimate destination by home agent ha. When ha forwards a 
message m generated at the mobile computer to next router q′, q′ applies ingress 
filtering to m and discovers that the original source of m (namely mobile 
computer c) is consistent with where m came from (namely home agent ha). Thus, 
q′ forwards m toward its ultimate destination as usual. However, one problem 
with reverse tunneling is that the cost of reverse tunneling is expensive. Every IP 
message generated at mobile computer c needs to unnecessarily travel all the way 
to home agent ha before it can be routed toward its ultimate destination, no matter 
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where the ultimate destination is. Reverse tunneling can be illustrated as in Figure 
7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: Reverse tunneling in mobile IP. 
 
We find that if hop integrity is deployed in all the routers of the network, 
then we can still use direct routing to route IP messages generated at mobile 
computer c toward their ultimate destinations, thereby avoiding the expensive cost 
of reverse tunneling. Recall that the problem with direct routing is that when next 
router q receives a message m generated at mobile computer c from foreign agent 
fa, q cannot determine from source address of m whether m is forwarded by fa, or 
m carries forged source address. However, if hop integrity is deployed in all the 
routers of the network, then foreign agent fa will add an integrity check d to 
message m before it forwards m to next router q. When next router q receives 
message m from fa, q can correctly determine from the integrity check d 
contained in m whether m was indeed forwarded by fa. If d is consistent with m, q 
accepts m, computes a new integrity check d for the next router, and proceeds to 
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forward it toward its ultimate destination. Otherwise, if d is not consistent with m, 
then q discards m. Thus the problem with direct routing is solved. This procedure 
is illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4: Direct routing in mobile IP with hop integrity. 
 
7.2 SECURE MULTICAST 
Multicast IP [Dee88] is a mechanism designed to transmit an IP message 
to a set of zero or more hosts identified by a single IP destination address. Many 
multicast protocols have been proposed and widely deployed in the Internet to 
achieve multicast IP, for example the Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol 
(or DVMRP, for short) [WPD88] and the Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM-
DM for Dense Mode and PIM-SM for Sparse Mode) [EFH+98]. Multicast 
protocols are based on organizing the routers between the multicast source and the 
multicast destinations into a rooted spanning tree. When a router in the spanning 
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tree receives a multicast IP message, it forwards a copy of the message to every 
multicast destination that is adjacent to it and to every router that is its “child” in 
the spanning tree. Figure 7.5 illustrated an example of a multicast spanning tree. 
In this example, router r.0 forwards a copy of message m to its two children in the 
spanning tree, namely r.1 and r.2, and router r.1 forwards a copy of m to its child 
r.3 in the spanning tree and to a multicast destination that is adjacent to it. Other 
routers in the spanning tree proceed in a similar way to forward a copy of m to 
every multicast destination in the spanning tree.  
 
 r.0
r.1 r.2 
r.3 r.4 r.5 
m 
mmm 
mm 
m
mm
m
routers 
destinations 
non-destinations  
Figure 7.5: A multicast spanning tree. 
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Because IP messages can be lost while in transit, the multicast IP 
protocols do not guarantee that every multicast message generated at the multicast 
source is eventually received at every multicast destination. Instead, the multicast 
IP protocols guarantee the following weaker correctness criterion: if a multicast 
destination receives a multicast IP message, then each multicast destination 
receives the same message with high probability.  
However, this weak correctness criterion can still be violated by a simple 
adversary as follows. If the adversary inserts a new multicast IP message between 
two routers in the middle of the spanning tree, or modifies a message while the 
message is being transmitted between two routers in the middle of the spanning 
tree, then only a small fraction of the multicast destinations eventually receive the 
inserted or modified message. In an example illustrated in Figure 7.6, an 
adversary sitting between router r.1 and router r.3 intercepts a message m 
forwarded by r.1 toward r.3, modifies m to become m′, and forwards m′ to r.3. 
Router r.3 accepts the modified message m′ unsuspiciously, and forwards a copy 
of m′ to the two multicast destinations that are adjacent to it. As a result, the 
above weak correctness criterion is violated because only the two multicast 
destinations that are adjacent to r.3 eventually receives the modified message m′. 
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Figure 7.6: Correctness criterion of multicast is violated by an adversary. 
 
We discover that hop integrity can be used to keep the above weak 
correctness criterion of multicast IP as follows. If hop integrity is deployed 
between each pair of adjacent routers in the spanning tree, then each pair of 
adjacent routers in the spanning tree share two unique secrets (one for each 
direction) that can be used to compute an integrity check for every message 
exchanged between this pair of routers. Therefore, every multicast IP message 
exchanged between any pair of adjacent routers in the spanning tree is protected 
by an integrity check added by the sending router. Because an adversary does not 
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know the secret shared between two adjacent routers, this adversary cannot 
compute a correct integrity check for any multicast IP message it inserts or 
modifies no matter where it is located. As a result, the inserted or modified 
multicast IP messages will be detected and discarded by the first router that 
receives them. For example, as shown in Figure 7.7, when router r.3 receives the 
modified message m′, r.3 detects that m′ is modified because its integrity check 
does not match m′. Thus r.3 discards m′ and will not forward m′ to any adjacent 
multicast destination.   
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Figure 7.7: Hop integrity keeps correctness criterion of multicast. 
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Therefore, if hop integrity is deployed between each pair of adjacent 
routers in the spanning tree, then no multicast destination will receive the inserted 
or modified multicast IP messages, and the weak correctness criterion is 
maintained. 
 
7.3 SECURITY OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Routers use routing protocols to compute the entire path or the next hop 
for forwarding a message toward its ultimate destination. Most widely used 
routing protocols, for example Routing Information Protocol (RIP for short) 
[Hed88, Mal94], Open Shortest Path First (OSPF for short) [Moy94], and 
ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP for short) [BZB+97], define their own routing 
messages that routers can use to exchange routing information with other routers 
on the network. The protection of routing messages is important because routing 
messages carry routing information that is vital to the correctness of routing 
protocols. If routing messages are messed up by an adversary, the operation of 
routing protocols will be disrupted and normal data messages will not be correctly 
routed toward their ultimate destination. 
There have been a number of works on how to extend specific routing 
protocols to make them more secure. However, if strong hop integrity protocol is 
deployed in each pair of adjacent routers in a network, then without any other 
security mechanism added, any routing protocol that is used in the network gets 
secured. In the following three subsections, we discuss how strong hop integrity 
can be applied to enhance the security of RIP, OSPF, and RSVP. 
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7.3.1 Security of RIP 
RIP [Hed88], which is shorthand for Routing Information Protocol, is a 
widely used routing protocol for IP-based networks. RIP allows a router to 
exchange routing information with its adjacent routers. It is a distance-vector 
protocol, which means that the routing information a router receives from an 
adjacent router is a vector of distances (measured in the number of hops) from the 
adjacent router to all possible destinations in the network. Each router then 
independently uses the routing information it receives from its adjacent routers to 
compute its best routes to all possible destinations in the network. (At the 
beginning of the execution of RIP, the routes computed by one router may not 
conform to those computed by another router, because a router does not have 
much routing information about the network initially. However, with the 
periodical update, routing information of each router will spread over the network 
and eventually the routes computed by different routers will converge to be 
consistent with each other.) 
There are two types of messages used in RIP, namely request and response 
messages. A router can send a request message to its adjacent routers to ask these 
routers to send back their current routing tables. A router that receives a request 
message is required to return a response message that contains its own routing 
table. Moreover, a router sends a response message to all its adjacent routers 
every 30 seconds. 
There is a security need for protecting the response messages that contain 
routing information in RIP. In the absence of any protection for response 
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messages, an adversary sitting between two routers in the network can disrupt the 
network in several ways. First, the adversary can either insert a fake response 
message with incorrect routing information that it fabricates. Second, the 
adversary can modify a correct response message and make its routing 
information incorrect. Third, the adversary can also replay a previous response 
message whose routing information is no longer correct. When a router receives a 
response message with incorrect routing information (from the adversary), it will 
unsuspiciously accept the message and use the incorrect routing information 
contained in the message to update its own routing table. Even worse, the router 
will send its routing table (incorrect now) to all adjacent routers. Consequently, 
the router may compute bad routes for destinations because of the false routing 
information it receives, and routing loops may be formed because of the spread of 
false routing information. 
The original RIP does not have any mechanism for authenticating the 
response messages. In RIP version 2 [Mal94], a simple authentication mechanism 
is added to every response message in the protocol: a 16-byte clear text password 
is inserted in every response message. This authentication mechanism is easy, but 
cannot provide enough protection because the adversary can easily copy the 
password and use it in the fake response messages it inserts, or copy a response 
message and replay it later. 
By contrast, strong hop integrity can protect a network against the three 
attacks on RIP mentioned above. If strong hop integrity protocol is implemented 
in each pair of adjacent routers in a network, then each pair of adjacent routers in 
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this network share two unique secrets (one for each direction) that can be used to 
compute an integrity check for every message exchanged between this pair of 
routers. Therefore, every RIP response message exchanged between any pair of 
adjacent routers in the network is protected by an integrity check and a (soft or 
hard) sequence number added by the sending router. If an adversary launches 
against the network the first attack or the second attack, namely inserting a fake 
RIP response message or modifying a correct RIP response message between any 
pair of adjacent routers, then the inserted or modified response message will be 
detected and discarded by the router that receives this message because the 
integrity check contained in this message is not correct. If an adversary launches 
against the network the third attack, namely replaying a previous RIP response 
message between any pair of adjacent routers, then the inserted or modified 
response message will be detected and discarded by the router that receives this 
message because the sequence number contained in this message is not correct. 
Therefore, strong hop integrity can secure RIP response messages, and can 
prevent an adversary from spreading false routing information over a network. 
7.3.2 Security of OSPF 
OSPF [Moy94], which is shorthand for Open Shortest Path First, is 
another widely used routing protocol in the Internet. Unlike RIP, OSPF is a link-
state protocol, which means that each router gathers information on the state of its 
links to all adjacent routers and sends the link state information to all other routers 
in the network. The process that a router forwards to its adjacent routers every 
link state message it receives without change is called flooding. By periodical 
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flooding, OSPF routers in the same network share a synchronized database that is 
consisted of link state records. These records represent the current topology of the 
network, and are used by OSPF routers to compute their best routes to 
destinations. 
OSPF protocol consists of three sub-protocols: Hello, Exchange, and 
Flooding protocols. The Hello protocol is used to check whether an adjacent 
router and the link connected to that router are up or not. A link between two 
routers is considered up if messages can go in both directions. After establishing 
their two-way connectivity, two routers can use the Exchange protocol to achieve 
the initial synchronization of their link state database by exchanging database 
description messages. A link might change its state as time goes by. Therefore, 
the router that is responsible for a link whose state has changed needs to advertise 
the new state of the link to all other routers in the network. This is done by using 
Flooding protocol to send a link state update message to all other routers, and 
other routers who receive this message should send back an acknowledgment 
message so as to keep every router’s link state database synchronized. 
The possible security threats faced by OSPF can be listed as follows. First, 
an adversary may insert a fake message that incorrectly advertises some link as 
the best route to other networks, so as to congest that link with high-volume 
misled traffic. Second, an adversary may modify a message that contains the state 
information of an important link, so that an area in the network might become 
unreachable. Third, an adversary may impersonate some router in a network and 
may insert a fake update message that requests all other routers to purge all link 
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state records of the impersonated router. By repeating this trick, the adversary can 
slash the link state database in every router. 
We discover that hop integrity can be used to counter the three attacks 
mentioned above. If hop integrity is implemented in each pair of adjacent routers 
in a network, then each pair of adjacent routers in this network share two unique 
secrets (one for each direction) that can be used to compute an integrity check for 
every message exchanged between this pair of routers. Therefore, every hello 
message, every database description message, every update message, and every 
acknowledgment message exchanged between any pair of adjacent routers in the 
network is protected by an integrity check added by the sending router. If an 
adversary inserts or modifies any OSPF message between any pair of adjacent 
routers, then the inserted or modified OSPF message will be detected and 
discarded by the first router that receives this message because the integrity check 
contained in this message is not correct. Therefore, OSPF messages are secured 
by hop integrity and an adversary cannot use inserted or modified OSPF messages 
to mess up link state databases maintained by routers. 
7.3.3 Security of RSVP 
RSVP [BZB+97], which is shorthand of ReSerVation Protocol, is a 
resource reservation protocol designed for providing integrated services in the 
Internet. RSVP allows a host that wants to receive particular application data 
flows from a sending host to request from the network a specific degree of 
services in advance (although there is no guarantee that the requested service is 
available in the network). RSVP also allows a router to exchange service requests 
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with other routers to establish and maintain state of the service it provides. Once 
the requested service is established, the host that requested the service is 
guaranteed that each router along the data path (between this host and the sending 
host) has reserved needed resources for the service the router promised to provide, 
and that the provided service will last till the end of the transmission of the data 
flow. 
There are two main types of messages used in RSVP, namely Resv and 
Path messages. Each sending host periodically sends a Path message to all 
receiving hosts for a data flow that this sending host generates. The Path message 
is designed to mark the path that is traveled by data messages. Each router along 
the data path maintains a state that remembers the previous router corresponding 
to this particular data flow. With the path information marked by Path messages, 
each receiving host is able to send Resv messages, which contain the reservation 
requests, toward the sending host. When receiving a Resv message, each router on 
the path determines how many resources it can grant to this reservation request, 
and relays the Resv message toward the sending host. 
The security issues concerned with RSVP are the integrity and 
authentication of service request messages. If an adversary spoofs the source 
address of a service request message, and the service request message is accepted 
by unsuspecting routers along the data path, the adversary can steal the 
established service. If an adversary modifies the parameter of service specified in 
a service request message, or replays several service request messages and inserts 
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them into the network, the normal service provided by the network may be 
severely reduced or totally denied. 
An extension to RSVP [BLT00] provides a mechanism to protect RSVP 
messages against message modification, message spoofing, and message replay. 
The proposed scheme uses a secret shared between a pair of adjacent RSVP 
routers to compute a keyed cryptographic digest of a RSVP message, and includes 
the digest as part of the RSVP message. However, a working key management 
protocol is missing in that proposal and manual key management may be 
necessary at its current stage.  
By contrast, if strong hop integrity along with ingress filtering is deployed 
in the network, then not only RSVP messages, but all other types of messages will 
also be protected against message modification, message spoofing, and message 
replay. Moreover, hop integrity is easier to manage because it updates shared 
secrets in a distributed way (by each pair of adjacent routers themselves). 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation, we introduced the concept of hop integrity in computer 
networks. A network is said to provide hop integrity if the following three 
conditions hold for every pair of adjacent routers p and q in the network. First, 
router p does not send any message m to router q over the subnetwork connecting 
p and q unless router q has been up and reachable shortly before m is sent. 
Second, whenever router q receives a message m over the subnetwork connecting 
routers p and q, q can determine correctly whether message m was modified by an 
adversary after it was sent by p and before it was received by q. Third, whenever 
router q receives a message m over the subnetwork connecting routers p and q, 
and determines that message m was not modified, then q can determine correctly 
whether message m is another copy of a message that is received earlier by q. 
We went on to introduce the three components of hop integrity, namely 
the secure address resolution protocol, the weak hop integrity protocol, and the 
strong hop integrity protocol. We discussed their functions, and specified each of 
the protocols in a formal fashion using a variation of Abstract Protocol Notation. 
We verified the correctness of each protocol using state transition diagrams. We 
showed the effectiveness of these protocols against most denial-of-service attacks, 
and discussed three other applications of hop integrity. We also present an 
enhanced version of the anti-replay window protocol in IPsec, which can serve as 
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an alternative to soft sequence number protocol to help the strong hop integrity 
protocol recover from reset. All the protocols are stateless, require small 
overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way. 
Thus, we believe they are compatible with IP in the Internet. 
In this chapter, we conclude the presentation of hop integrity with 
implementation considerations of hop integrity protocols and a list of three open 
problems that are left for future research. 
  
8.1 IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
In this section, we discuss several issues concerning the implementation of 
hop integrity protocols presented in Chapters 4 and 5. In particular, we discuss 
acceptable values for the inputs of each of these protocols. 
There are four inputs in the secret exchange protocol presented in Chapter 
4. They are Rp, Bq, te and tr. Input Rp is a private key for router p, and input Bq is a 
public key for router q. These are long-term keys that remain fixed for long 
periods of time (say one to three months), and can be changed only off-line and 
only by the system administrators of the two routers. Thus, these keys should 
consist of a relatively large number of bytes, say 128 bytes (1024 bits) each. 
There are no special requirements for the encryption and decryption functions that 
use these keys in the secret exchange protocol. 
Input te is the time period between two successive secret exchanges 
between pe and qe. This time period should be small so that an adversary does not 
have enough time to deduce the secrets sp and sq used in computing the integrity 
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checks of data messages. It should also be large so that the overhead that results 
from the secret exchanges is reduced. An acceptable value for te is around 4 
hours. 
Input tr is the time-out period for resending a rqst message when the last 
rqst message or the corresponding rply message was lost. The value of tr should 
be an upper bound on the round-trip delay between the two adjacent routers. If the 
two routers are connected by a high speed Ethernet, then an acceptable value of tr 
is around 4 seconds. 
Next, we consider the two inputs sp and sq and function MD used in the 
integrity check protocols in Chapters 4 and 5. Inputs sp and sq are short-lived 
secrets that are updated every 4 hours. Thus, this key should consist of a relatively 
small number of bytes, say 8 bytes. Function MD is used to compute the digest of 
a data message. Function MD is computed in two steps as follows. First, the 
standard function MD5 [Riv92] is used to compute a 16-byte digest of the data 
message. Second, the first 4 bytes from this digest constitute our computed 
message digest. (Computing a message digest over a 1024-byte message using 
MD5 is timed at just 0.037 ms on a Pentium III 730MHz machine running Linux. 
It is not a significant overhead to a router.) 
The soft sequence numbers in Chapter 5 can be recycled provided that not 
each of the sequence numbers has been used at least once in time period te. In a 
usual Ethernet, at most 800 messages can be sent in a second, thus at most 
11,520,000 messages can be sent in a period of 4 hours. Using 4 bytes to store the 
soft sequence numbers is a proper choice with considerations of covering the 
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maximum number of consumed sequence numbers in time period te and aligning 
with the original IP header. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, input N needs to be much larger than 1. For 
example, N can be chosen 200. In this case, the maximum number of messages 
that can be discarded wrongly whenever synchronization between two adjacent 
routers is lost is 200, and the probability that an adversary who replays an old 
message will be detected is 99 percent. 
The message overhead of the strong integrity check protocol is about 8 
bytes per data message: 4 bytes for storing the message digest, and 4 bytes for 
storing the soft sequence number of the message. 
In order to verify the integrity of each message, hop integrity protocols 
compute and add an integrity check digest to each message. We propose to add 
the integrity check digest to the IP options in the IP header of each message. IP 
options are auxiliary fields used mainly for network control or testing purposes. 
They are added at the tail of the standard 20-byte IP header, and the total length of 
all IP options in a message can be as much as 40 bytes because the maximum 
length of IP header is 60 bytes. Special options for the integrity check digest can 
be defined and inserted into the IP options field of each message. 
For more discussions of proper values for the variables used in the 
protocols, please refer to [GEH+02]. 
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8.2 OPEN PROBLEMS 
In this section, we discuss three open problems that are left for future 
research. 
First, if in a network some hops are assured to be adversary-proof (for 
example, the hops between core routers), then hop integrity does not need to be 
implemented over these hops. How to systematically compute a proper 
deployment map of hop integrity according to the topology of a network is a good 
problem to explore. 
Second, if some messages are not security-sensitive, then routers on the 
path of these messages do not need to apply hop integrity on these messages. Our 
proposal of inserting the integrity check digest into the IP options field provides 
prospects of this selective hop integrity protection because options field is not a 
required field in the standard IP header. However, we still need to distinguish 
which types of messages do not need the protection of hop integrity. 
Third, a software implementation of hop integrity protocols may not be 
efficient because a router needs to compute integrity check digests for all the 
multitude of messages that pass it. Therefore, we can consider an alternative of 
hardware implementation. There are a couple of possibilities. We can implement 
hop integrity protocols on a Network Interface Card (NIC for short), or we can 
build a application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC for short) that executes hop 
integrity protocols using system-on-chip (SoC for short) design technology. 
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